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Although in some areas of European Union (EU) law there have been rapid developments and 
dense harmonisation, in other areas, progress has been rather limited. Taxation and especially 
corporate taxation is one such area. There are a number of reasons why the development of EU 
tax law has not kept pace with other areas of law; most importantly, the lack of Union 
competence in direct tax matters and as a corollary the fiscal veto enjoyed by all Member 
States. Under the principle of attribution of powers,1 a cornerstone of the European legal 
structure, the Union and its institutions only enjoy competence in the areas of law assigned or 
conferred to them under the Treaties. This principle of attribution of powers must be respected 
both internally and in the Union’s external sphere of affairs. Therefore, every act must be based 
on a general or specific Treaty provision (the legal basis) empowering the Union, expressly or 
impliedly, to act.  
 
All EU Treaties have been silent on direct taxation. While the Treaties dealt with indirect taxes 
to some extent,2 there were never any references to direct taxes. As such, there is no explicit 
legislative base for the harmonization of direct taxes and Member States are considered to have 
retained complete competence in this area. General (proxy) legislative bases under Article 115 
TFEU and Article 352 TFEU have been used for direct tax legislation. These legislative bases 
focus on the attainment of the internal market3 and their use is strictly policed by the Court of 
Justice. The few corporate tax directives we currently have in this area were enacted under 
these legislative bases.4  
 
Therefore, the EU corporate tax legislative process is actually quite simple. Corporate tax 
legislative proposals are invariably drafted as directives by the European Commission, most 
often on the basis of Art 115 TFEU; i.e. with the pretext that the measures are needed for the 
establishment or proper functioning of the internal market. For such proposals to become EU 
secondary legislation, unanimity in Council is required. In other words, all Member States (in 
Council) have to unanimously agree to the legislative proposals. The European Parliament has 
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no official involvement in the enactment of tax legislation. Whilst it may be consulted or it 
may offer its views on a matter without necessarily being asked, its role is largely advisory. 
 
This so-called fiscal veto, i.e. the power of even one Member State to object to a harmonizing 
measure in direct tax law, has played a decisive role in the development of EU corporate tax 
law. The fiscal veto that Member States enjoy is a fiercely guarded prerogative which has 
survived successive Treaty amendments and attempts to move to qualified majority voting.5 
However, the lack of competence combined with the fiscal veto means that the regulation of 
direct taxes is effectively left at the discretion of Member States. As such, adopting a uniform 
fiscal policy or a uniform corporate tax policy has proved impossible. So far, Member States 
have shown divergent approaches and appetites to tax harmonization in general and corporate 
tax harmonisation in particular. This is evident from the protracted negotiations often taking 
place for the adoption of a directive or the amendment to a directive, as with the proposals to 
introduce the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base or the Financial Transaction Tax. 
Both of these proposals are considered below. 
 
It should also be noted that international (direct) taxation in general is not as regulated as other 
areas such as trade or investment. When the EEC was created in the mid-1950s, the regulation 
of direct taxes was not seen as a priority; nor an option for that matter due to the lack of 
competences. The main priority was the removal of the distortions caused by trade barriers – 
hence, the concentration on the harmonization of indirect taxes. Today, we have a fairly 
harmonized system of Value Added Tax (VAT). This is a general and broadly based 
consumption tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. Under the EU’s VAT 
system, the framework rules are uniform but the rates are largely left to Member States, subject 
to certain minimum rates.6 Even though the VAT system is considered to be harmonized, it is 
the Member States that collect this tax and not the EU institutions.7 Customs8 and excises9 are 
also broadly harmonized in the EU and are administered in a similar way. 
 
The same cannot be said as regards direct taxation and especially corporate taxation. It is still 
the case today that, in principle, every country has jurisdiction to tax in any way it sees fit. 
Whilst there are some model tax treaties, such as the OECD Model Tax Convention10 or the 
UN Model Tax Convention11 which suggest ways of allocating tax jurisdiction between the 
country of source and the country of residence, these models are not binding on countries,12 
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nor are they set in stone. In fact, these models are regularly updated in light of new 
developments. Certainly, there are some pragmatic limitations affecting the tax sovereignty of 
countries as far as the imposition of extra-territorial taxation is concerned – mostly 
enforceability and customary international law.13 However, the regulation of their direct tax 
affairs and especially the design and implementation of their corporate tax systems, is very 
much left at the discretion of Member States.  
 
It should be pointed out that, technically, the EU does not receive any yields collected under 
the corporate tax systems of Member States – at least not directly. The EU’s revenue is derived 
from its so-called own resources system,14 which includes customs duties on imports from 
outside the EU and sugar levies,15 a small percentage of the harmonised VAT base of each 
Member State,16 as well as other sources of revenue.17 The largest source of own resource is, 
however, based on gross national income - each Member State transfers a percentage of its 
gross national income to the EU.18 Member States’ contributions are not fixed and depend on 
what is needed to finance the balance of total expenditure not covered by the other own 
resources. Therefore, on a yearly basis, and depending on the financing needs of the EU, part 
of the corporate taxes collected by a Member State go to the EU because they form part of the 
gross national income of that Member State from which a contribution must be made and not 
because the EU has direct authority to levy corporate taxes.   
 
Notwithstanding this, the EU’s involvement in the development of corporate tax law – at least 
historically -19 was not aimed at helping (or forcing) Member States to increase their corporate 
tax yields and as a corollary, their contributions to the EU. Rather, the emphasis was on the 
impact of domestic corporate tax rules with the internal market and more specifically, the 
enjoyment of the various fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EU Treaties. The European 
Commission has long recognised that taxation has a significant role to play for the EU to 
become the most competitive economy in the world.20 Indeed, up until 2012, the focus of 
attention of the European Commission was on removing tax obstacles to cross-border 
movement, as this would improve market access, increase competition, spur investment and 
innovation, and enhance the competitiveness of the EU. From 2012 onwards, which broadly 
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20 Commission, The Contribution of Taxation and Customs Policies to the Lisbon Strategy, COM(2005) 532 
coincides with the launch of the OECD/G20 initiative to curb base erosion and profit splitting,21 
the focus of attention seems to have shifted to dealing with aggressive tax planning and 
avoidance, without, however, abandoning ongoing efforts to remove corporate tax obstacles in 
a more holistic way, as is shown below. 
 
Broadly, what could currently be considered as the corporate tax legislation of the European 
Union is a patchwork of minimum rules (enacted through directives) which try to address some 
of the distortions caused by the co-existence of different and largely unharmonised corporate 
tax systems of Member States. The Merger Directive tries to deal with obstacles arising from 
certain types of cross-border mergers and reorganisations.22 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive23 
tries to alleviate double taxation arising from the cross-border payment of profit distributions 
(usually dividends) between group companies, under certain conditions. The Interest and 
Royalties Directive does the same, vis-à-vis cross-border interest and royalty payments 
between group companies.24 There are also minimum rules which facilitate Member States in 
cooperating between themselves for the recovery of taxes or for exchange of information.25 In 
addition, there are now some minimum anti-avoidance rules which endeavor to provide a 
common approach to some common anti-avoidance techniques.26 There are also rules which 
help streamline tax dispute resolution involving two different competent authorities, as well as 
establishing mandatory arbitration.27 This body of law is buttressed by the voluminous case 
law of the Court of Justice, which sets out how the general fundamental freedoms are to be 
interpreted in various (often complex) corporate tax scenarios.28 
 
The purpose of this article is not to go through all of the legislative instruments or case law 
relevant to the EU’s corporate tax law. Rather, the aim is to review some aspects of the EU’s 
corporate tax set-up which correspond to aspects of a country’s corporate tax regime. The 
overarching question is whether there is such thing as EU corporate tax law. This article seeks 
to address this in the context of the following issues: the existence of a uniform tax base and 
tax rates, the existence of anti-abuse rules and a transfer pricing regime; and, finally, the 
existence of a common tax administration and its powers. The article questions whether the 
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peripatetic development of EU corporate tax law is suitable for the EU or whether it undermines 
the EU’s long-term objectives. The potential impact of Brexit in the development of EU 








Broadly, a corporate tax base is the set of rules upon which the assessment or determination of 
corporate tax liability is based. In the European Union, there is no harmonised corporate tax 
base nor a common tax rate – at least not yet. However, there have been on-going efforts to 
create a common corporate tax base to facilitate cross-border corporate groups.  
 
In its ground-breaking 2001 Company Tax Study,29 the European Commission recommended 
a single set of rules to calculate the taxable profits of companies in the EU. This Study set the 
parameters for a very important proposal in the area of corporate tax law – the proposal on a 
common tax base and consolidation. As an alternative to targeted solutions, the possibility of 
adopting a comprehensive solution was examined. It was reiterated numerous times in the 2001 
Company Tax Study 30 that the existence of 15 tax systems (at the time) was the source of most 
of the tax obstacles to cross-border movement. Several comprehensive measures predicated on 
a single tax base were recommended by the European Commission, with preference for the 
Common (Consolidated) Base.  
 
Ever since the publication of the 2001 Company Tax Study, the European Commission had 
been working on a project for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). On 16 
March 2011, the European Commission published the eagerly awaited (first) official proposal 
for the CCCTB.31 Broadly, the 2011 CCCTB proposal provided companies with establishments 
in at least two Member States with detailed optional rules to compute their group taxable 
income according to one set of rules, those of the new consolidated tax base, rather than 
according to the national tax bases of each Member State. The overall aim of the CCCTB was 
to reduce the costs of complying with 27 (at the time) tax regimes, to minimise tax arbitrage 
and to simplify restructurings. It was also aimed at providing comprehensive consolidation of 
profits and losses on an EU basis.32 In other words, the CCCTB was essentially proposed as a 
28th system – all Member States would adopt it as an alternative to their existing corporate tax 
systems. The European Commission extolled the proposal, in that it would offer companies a 
‘one-stop-shop’ system for filing their tax returns, as well as provide for consolidation. This 
would translate into savings in compliance time and costs.33 It was also claimed that the new 
system would bring tangible benefits for companies wishing to expand into other Member 
States.34 
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 Although the proposal was not immediately curbed on the basis of subsidiarity and enjoyed the 
support of the European Parliament, which in fact advocated for its mandatory application,35 
not much happened thereafter. After years of technical discussions in Council, it was clear that 
some of the provisions of the original CCCTB proposal and especially consolidation were too 
ambitious to be adopted all at once. Several Member States and, in particular, the UK were 
opposed to this proposal, as they would lose much of their powers to determine corporate tax 
policy. Smaller Member States were also concerned that formulary apportionment under this 
proposal would have the overall effect of shifting tax revenues to larger countries with larger 
markets such as France and Germany.36  
It was widely thought that discussions on the more controversial aspects of the proposal – 
notably, consolidation and formulary apportionment – were holding back progress on other 
less controversial but still important areas, which could be agreed more quickly. Furthermore, 
the 2011 CCCTB proposal was very much overshadowed by the high profile OECD/G20 BEPS 
initiative37 and the EU’s eager response to this initiative.38 Arguably, the 2011 CCCTB 
proposal had to be adjusted to be perceived as truly effective in tackling aggressive tax planning 
and not just to reduce compliance costs for multinationals. 
 
With the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission, 
interest in the CCCTB was reinvigorated. In October 2015, a consultation on the relaunch of 
the CCCTB was published39 and in the 2015 Action Plan for a Fair and Efficient Corporate 
Tax System,40 the European Commission announced that it would relaunch the CCCTB the 
following year. This was to be done through a two-step approach: Member States would first 
agree on rules for a common tax base, after which agreement would be reached on the 
consolidation element. Neither the original proposal published in 2011,41 nor the later 2016 
proposals involved changes to Member States’ corporate tax rates. 
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OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing. Available at: 
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6); (3) country-by-country reporting (Action 13); and (4) improving dispute resolution (Action 14). 
38 HJI Panayi, Advanced Issues in International and European Tax Law (Hart Publishing, 2015), chapters 5-6 
39 See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/relaunch_ccctb_en.htm  
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘A Fair and Efficient 
Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action’ COM(2015) 302 final, 17 June 2015. 
41 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2011), 121/4 
2011/0058 (CNS). See, generally, HJI Panayi (2013), Chapter 3, fn. 4. Also see Christiana HJI Panayi, The 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and the UK (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011). 
Indeed, the proposals relaunched in October 2016 consisted of two separate Directives, one for 
a Common Corporate Tax Base (the CCTB)42 and the other, again, for a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (the CCCTB).43 The difference between the CCTB and the CCCTB is the 
cross-border consolidation of profits and losses, as well as the elimination of intra-group 
transactions. Certainly, the momentum generated by the BEPS project helped fast-track this 
relaunch, as under the new proposals the focus of attention shifted from the objective of 
facilitating corporate groupings and simplifying compliance, to countering tax avoidance.  
 
The first important feature of the original and the subsequent proposals is the common tax base. 
There are uniform rules for the calculation of the tax base of group members that fall under the 
scope of the Directive. The second important feature of the proposals is consolidation; i.e. the 
automatic set-off of profits and losses and the elimination of intra-group transactions for group 
members. One important difference between the 2011 and the 2016 proposals is that the 
provisions for consolidation have now been moved to a different Directive so that there can at 
least be progress with the common tax base. Another important difference between the 2016 
CCTB/CCCTB proposals and the 2011 CCCTB proposal is that the new rules (i.e. the common 
tax base and subsequently consolidation) are mandatory for large corporate groups - defined 
as groups with a consolidated turnover exceeding €750m.44 It is no longer an option for eligible 
groups to opt-in the new tax base, as it was in the 2011 proposal. However, companies falling 
outside the scope of the proposed Directive45 may opt to apply its rules under certain conditions 
(voluntary opt-in).46 Therefore, the CCTB/CCCTB proposals, if enacted, would replace 
Member States’ corporate tax bases for eligible taxpayers rather than provide an additional 
optional tax base to choose from.  
 
Furthermore, the proposed rules are limited to EU-resident companies (the qualifying 
subsidiaries)47 and EU permanent establishments. Contrary to the 2011 CCCTB proposal, the 
revised permanent establishment definition refers only to permanent establishments situated in 
the EU and belonging to a taxpayer resident for tax purposes in the EU. EU permanent 
establishments of third country companies are not covered – their position is to be dealt with 
in bilateral tax treaties and national law. 
 
Under the new common tax base, tax base is designed broadly. It is stipulated in the preamble 
that all revenues will be taxable unless expressly exempted.48 The basic formulation of the tax 
base is the following: revenues less exempt revenues, deductible expenses and other deductible 
items.49 All these concepts are defined in the proposals. There is also a list of non-deductible 
expenses.50 The 2016 Directive (as the original 2011 proposal) also contains detailed rules on 
                                                          
42 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016)685 final. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_685_en.pdf (CCTB Directive) 
43 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016)683 final. 
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45 Art 2 of the draft CCTB Directive 
46 See proposed Art 2(3) of the draft CCTB Directive 
47  A ‘qualifying subsidiary’ is defined as every immediate and lower-tier subsidiary in which the parent company 
has a right to exercise more than 50% of the voting rights and it has an ownership right amounting to more than 
75% of the subsidiary’s capital or profit. See proposed Art 5(1) of the draft CCTB Directive. 
48 Preamble, p.9, of the draft CCTB Directive 
49 Ibid, Art 7 of the draft CCTB Directive 
50 Ibid, Art 12 of the draft CCTB Directive 
depreciation.51 For the purposes of calculating the tax base, transactions are measured by 
reference, inter alia, to monetary consideration and market value.52  
 
What is novel in the 2016 CCTB proposal is the very generous provision for deduction: the 
super-deduction for R&D costs. It is provided that on top of the amounts already deductible for 
R&D costs, a deduction of an extra 50% of R&D costs each tax year will be granted for costs 
up to €20m and 25% for expenditure above this level. An enhanced 100% extra deduction will 
be available to start-ups for R&D expenditure up to €20m.53 The CCTB does not provide for a 
patent or innovation box, but this is thought to be a good alternative to entice Member States 
to agree to the proposal and abandon their own patent boxes. It will also help attract high-value 
R&D activities to the EU. 
 
Another addition to the CCTB proposal is the allowance for growth and investment (AGI), 
which was inserted to neutralise the current asymmetry between debt and equity financing.54 
The AGI is defined as the difference between the equity of a taxpayer and the tax value of its 
participation in the capital of associated enterprises.55 Pursuant to this rule, taxpayers will be 
given a deduction in respect of a notional yield on defined increases in their equity (the AGI 
equity base).56 This will be deductible from their taxable base subject to certain conditions 
dealing with anti-tax avoidance. In case of an AGI equity base decrease, an amount equal to 
the notional yield of the AGI equity decrease shall become taxable. ‘The outcome is a definitive 
advantage in favour of financing through debt as opposed to equity.’57 
 
The original 2011 CCCTB proposal and the 2016 CCCTB Directive set out the conditions for 
the formation of a consolidated tax group, as well as the mechanism for formulary 
apportionment and allocation of the consolidated tax base to the relevant Member States. In 
addition, there are rules for entering and leaving a group, the treatment of losses, business 
reorganisations and the intra-group transfer of assets. Consolidation is mandatory to all groups 
that fall within the scope of the CCTB proposal – i.e. with a consolidated group revenue 
exceeding €750m. The formula for apportionment is identical to the one proposed in the 2011 
CCCTB proposal and is based on three equally-weighted factors: labour, assets and sales.58 As 
in the 2011 proposal, intangible assets are excluded from the base of the asset factor and the 
sales factor is sales by destination.59 The 2016 CCCTB Directive also contains sector-specific 
formulae for financial institutions,60 insurance,61 oil and gas,62 shipping and air transport.63 
 
As in the original proposal, there are detailed administrative provisions for consolidated 
groups.64 The CCCTB is meant to offer qualifying groups a one-stop-shop approach – the group 
                                                          
51 Ibid, chapter IV, art 30 et seq. of the draft CCTB Directive 
52 Ibid, Art 20 of the draft CCTB Directive 
53 Ibid, Art 9(3) of the draft CCTB Directive 
54 Ibid, Art 11 of the draft CCTB Directive 
55 Ibid, Art 11(1) of the draft CCTB Directive 
56 Ibid, Art 11(3) of the draft CCTB Directive 
57 See explanatory memorandum of the draft CCTB Directive, p 10. 
58 See Chapter VIII of proposed CCCTB Directive  
59 See Arts 37-38 of the CCCTB Directive 
60 Art 40 of the draft CCCTB Directive 
61 Art 41 of the draft CCCTB Directive 
62 Art 42 of the draft CCCTB Directive 
63 Art 43 of the draft CCCTB Directive 
64 See chapter IX of the draft CCCTB Directive 
would deal with one Member State tax administration in the EU, which is usually the Member 
State where the group’s parent company is tax resident.65 
 
It should be emphasised that neither the initial CCCTB proposal, nor the subsequent ones affect 
tax rates. The draft Directives seek to harmonise the tax base and not the tax rates, though there 
have been unofficial calls to impose a minimum corporate tax rate.66 The CCTB/CCCTB 
determines the portion of the consolidated tax base that belongs to a Member State. Member 
States will be entitled to tax the income apportioned to them according to their own rates. This 
was emphasised by the European Commission upon the release of the original CCCTB 
Directive67 and reiterated in the press release of the subsequent CCTB/CCCTB Directives.68 
As stated: 
 
“Corporate tax rates are not covered by the CCCTB, as these remain an area of national sovereignty. However, 
the CCCTB will create a more transparent, efficient and fair system for calculating the tax base of cross-border 
companies, which will substantially reform corporate taxation throughout the EU.” 
 
Although the CCCTB is not meant to affect tax rates (just the taxable income that will be 
apportioned to the relevant countries), if approved, this will reform the rules on corporate 
taxation in the EU, but mostly as regards multinationals.69 Whether there will be a spill-over 
effect on domestic corporate tax rules affecting taxpayers with a consolidated group revenue 
of less than 750 million euros remains to be seen. Furthermore, whether the harmonization of 
the rules on the corporate tax base will also eventually lead to the harmonization of tax rates 
(or the creation of bands of rates), that also remains to be seen.  
 
Interestingly, there are currently two pending proposals that actually provide for the imposition 
of a tax and at a certain rate. One is a long-standing proposal for the imposition of a financial 
transaction tax and the other is a recent proposal for a 3% digital services tax. 
 
The Directive to introduce a common system of Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) was 
published in 2011.70 The FTT was largely a reactive measure to the financial crisis, engulfing 
the EU (and the rest of the world) at the time. The FTT was indeed hailed as a levy imposed to 
ensure that the financial sector contributed to the costs of the financial crisis. The FTT was also 
meant to discourage excessively risky activities by financial institutions but it was not meant 
to affect citizens and businesses. It would only apply if one of the two parties was a financial 
institution and if one of the two parties – whether the financial institution or the non-financial 
                                                          
65 See detailed rules in Chapter IX of the proposed CCCTB Directive 
66 See, for example, call for a 25% rate by the European Trade Union Confederation: 
https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-position-common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-ccctb  
There has also been speculation that France and Germany want a minimum corporate tax rate. See 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/11630468/France-and-Germany-behind-plans-for-
common-EU-corporation-tax.html; https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/a-tax-collision-course-223953 
Recently, it was reported that Germany wants a minimum tax for large tech companies. See 
https://www.engadget.com/2018/10/22/germany-global-minimum-tax-large-tech-companies/  
67 HJI Panayi (2011), fn.41. 
68 See the press release, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3471_en.htm  
69 See, a recent working paper, which explores the potential impact of the introduction of a Common Corporate 
Tax Base on the tax burden of corporations. See Taxation Papers, Working Paper, 75-2019,“The Impact of the 
CCTB on the Effective Tax Burden of Corporations: results from the Tax Analyzer Model” (Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2019).  
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/taxation_paper_75.pdf 
70 Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 
2008/7/EC, COM(201) 594 final, Brussels, 28 September 2011 (henceforth 2011 FTT Proposal). 
institution – was established in a Member State.71 A tax of 0.1% for most financial transactions 
other than derivatives and 0.01% for derivative contracts was proposed. These were minimum 
rates and participating Member States were entitled to apply higher rates. It was proposed that 
each financial institution that was a party to the financial transaction would pay the tax and 
there would be joint and several liability as regards this charge. The European Commission 
estimated revenues of approximately €57 billion annually without clearly stipulating how the 
revenue would be used. It was thought that some of it would be allocated to the EU Budget, 
thus reducing the contributions of Member States. 
 
The proposed Directive was never approved. From the beginning, the proposal was not seen 
favourably by a number of Member States and especially the UK, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Denmark. By June 2012 at the ECOFIN meeting, it became clear 
that the European Commission's proposal would not gather the necessary support to be 
unanimously adopted by Member States. It could only be adopted through the enhanced 
cooperation procedure set out under the EU Treaties,72 which requires a minimum of nine 
Member States to adopt a legislative measure between themselves even if not all Member 
States agree to this measure.  
 
Adoption of this proposal through enhanced cooperation was indeed instigated by Germany 
and France and eventually supported by the European Commission on 23 October 2012. The 
FTT proposal, backed by 10 Member States at the time and eventually 11 Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and 
Slovakia) was approved by the European Parliament in December 2012. In January 2013, the 
adoption of the FTT through enhanced cooperation was approved by qualified majority at the 
ECOFIN Council. The UK, Luxembourg, Malta and the Czech Republic raised concerns that 
the European Commission had not provided any analysis of the impacts that an FTT through 
enhanced cooperation would have on individual Member States. The dissenting Member States 
abstained from voting. 
 
Thereafter, on 14 February 2013, the European Commission published a proposal for a Council 
directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax,73 
accompanied by another Impact Assessment.74 There were some differences in the new 
proposal75 and the revenue estimate was adjusted to €30–35 billion per year. Part of this would 
be added to the EU Budget directly as an own resource, reducing the contributions of 
participating Member States accordingly. This proposal had to be unanimously approved by 
the participating Member States to be adopted by them. 
 
                                                          
71 For an analysis of the proposed rules, see HJI Panayi (2015), fn. 21, chapter 8 
72 Article 20 TEU and Articles 326-334 TFEU 
73 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, 
COM(2013) 71 final. 
74 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax: analysis of policy 
options and impacts’, SWD(2013) 28 final of 14 February 2013. 
75 Compared to the 2011 FTT proposal, the most important change was the introduction of the issuance principle, 
whereby financial instruments issued in the participating Member States will be taxed when traded, even if the 
parties trading them were not established in FTT Member States. This principle was thought to be the most 
contentious recommendation and in certain circumstances it could have extraterritorial effects. A General Anti-
Abuse Rule has also been inserted. See HJI Panayi (2015), fn.21, chapter 8 and Christiana HJI Panayi, “The EU’s 
Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation and the UK’s challenge”, (2013) 8 European Taxation 358-
367. 
The European Commission’s revised proposal was met with strong disapproval by the UK. 
Eventually, the UK Government challenged the authorising decision to adopt the FTT through 
enhanced cooperation at the Court of Justice,76 arguing that it would have extraterritorial effect 
and would result in non-participating Member States incurring implementation and collection 
costs. The Court of Justice rejected the UK's request on the basis that its arguments were 
founded on the draft Directive, which was not part of the decision to authorise the use of 
enhanced cooperation.77 The overtone of the decision was that if and when an FTT is adopted 
under enhanced cooperation, it may be possible to challenge the measures at that point. 
Therefore, a subsequent challenge could be admissible, depending on the form and scope of 
any FTT. 
 
Even though this decision effectively gave participating countries the green light to proceed 
with enhanced cooperation, nevertheless, the FTT proposal is yet to be adopted. With Brexit, 
there are lingering doubts as to whether the FTT would go forward if its provisions do not apply 
to the UK, notwithstanding intermittent attempts by some Member States to force through the 
adoption of this proposal (or versions of it).78  
 
Another proposal which stipulates the actual imposition of a tax is the recent proposal for a 
digital services tax. This proposal was in the context of a high-profile package of proposals, 
intended to introduce a “Fair and Effective Tax System in the EU for the Digital Single 
Market”.79 Although the international tax community had also attempted to tackle some of the 
problems arising in taxing the digital economy in the context of the BEPS project, it did not 
produce any concrete recommendations (or minimum standards).80 The EU has been much 
bolder in this area. In an earlier report published in 2014 by the EU Group on Digital 
Economy,81 it was recommended that all goods and services should be taxed at the place of 
consumption.82 Whilst the Group argued that there was no need for a new concept of digital 
taxable presence, nevertheless, later initiatives focused on this point. Following a 
                                                          
76 Case C-209/13 United Kingdom v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:283 
77 The review of the Court of Justice was limited to the issue of whether that decision was valid as such in light of 
Art 20 TEU and Arts 326–334 TFEU, which defined the substantive and procedural conditions relating to the 
granting of such authorisation. As such, the Court of Justice found the challenge to be premature. 
78 See, for example, the 2018 summer reports that the French and German finance ministers have suggested the 
relaunch of the FTT, and its adoption by all Member States. Tax Analysts, Doc 2018-25787 (22 June 2018). For 




79 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Fair and Efficient 
Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, COM(2017) 547 final, Brussels, 21 September 
2017. 
80 See OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, p.12. Available on: 
http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315281e.pdf?expires=1463923623&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=97DF
377C062AF3ECE7211A4A33BF3042. Also see the more recent OECD interim report in this area: OECD (2018), 
Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en. 
81 Report of the Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy (2014), p.5. Available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/good_governance_matters/digital/r
eport_digital_economy.pdf  
82 The Group on Digital Economy suggested that the EU Mini One Stop which at the time already covered 
business-to-consumer sales of telecommunications, television/radio broadcasting and electronic services should 
be expanded into a broad One Stop Shop to cover all business-to-consumer transactions. See HJI Panayi, fn. 21, 
chapter 5 
communication on a fair and efficient tax system in the European Union for the single digital 
market,83 on 21 March, 2018, the European Commission produced several proposals, setting 
out its vision of short-term and long-term legislative measures.84 One of these was a proposal 
for a Directive on the introduction of a digital permanent establishment concept based on 
significant digital presence. Another proposal was for a Directive on a Digital Services Tax. 
These proposals were accompanied by a Recommendation to Member States to amend their 
tax treaties with third countries so that the same rules apply to EU and non-EU companies.  
 
The first legislative proposal for a digital permanent establishment represents a long-term 
measure for taxing the digital economy. The proposal enables taxation of profits from digital 
activities, insofar as such profits are attributable to a significant digital presence maintained by 
entities (EU or non-EU) in a Member State.85 There are rules as to when significant digital 
presence is deemed to exist, and how to determine the profits which are attributable to it. 
Through its Recommendation,86 the European Commission also put forward a proposal to 
amend existing tax treaties between Member States and third countries to incorporate the new 
rules. Overall, this is a proposal which will affect the tax base of a Member State, as it 
establishes when certain activities would be taxable as activities of a permanent establishment. 
 
The second legislative proposal which is important for our purposes represents a short-term 
measure: the introduction of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of 
certain digital services.87 The digital services tax will apply at the rate of 3% on gross revenues 
created from activities where users played a major role in value creation such as selling of 
online advertising space; making available to users of a multi-sided digital interface; 
transmission of data collected about users and generated from users’ activities on digital 
interfaces. This approach follows the logic that it was the user’s involvement in the digital 
activities of a company which generating the value for that company, even though there may 
not be a payment from the users’ side.88 Only entities with total annual worldwide revenues of 
€ 750 million and EU taxable revenues of € 50 million will be subject to this tax, irrespective 
of whether they are established in a Member State or third country. The European Commission 
estimated that €5 billion per year could be generated for Member States if the tax is applied at 
a rate of 3%.89  
 
Luxembourg and Ireland have vehemently opposed the digital services tax, calling for 
discussions on a global approach at the OECD level. Opposition to the European Commission’s 
proposals is also growing, with Lithuania, Czech Republic, Malta and several Nordic countries 
thought to be against the proposals.90  Even Member States that were initially in favour of an 
                                                          
83 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Fair and Efficient Tax 
System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, COM(2017) 547 final, Brussels, 21 September 2017. 
84 Also see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Time to establish 
a modern, fair and efficient taxation standard for the digital economy, COM(2018)146 final 
85 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence, COM(2018) 147 final 
86 Commission Recommendation of 21.3.2018 relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, 
C(2018) 1650 final 
87 Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the 
provision of certain digital services, COM(2018) 148 final 
88 Ibid, p.11 
89 See Questions and Answers on a Fair and Efficient Tax System in the EU for the Digital Single Market, 
Factsheet, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-2141_en.htm  
90 See analysis in 90 Tax Notes Int'l 775 (May 7, 2018). Also see HJI Panayi, chapter 18[22] in Gore-Browne EU 
Company Law, fn. 4. 
EU solution are now more reluctant for an EU solution – or at least this EU solution.91 One 
recurrent argument is that this shift in taxing rights based on the location of the digital user in 
value creation is a major deviation from internationally recognised taxation principles and 
should be agreed at an international level and not by the EU unilaterally. Even the European 
Parliament has proposed92 that a sunset clause should be introduced, under which a digital 
services tax would be a temporary levy valid until an agreement has been reached 
internationally. It was also recommended that the Member States most adversely affected by 
the introduction of the tax could be allocated a greater part of the revenue from the interim 
tax.93  
 
Against this background, unsurprisingly, at the December 2018 ECOFIN meeting, the Austrian 
Presidency did not manage to gain the necessary support for the proposal to be approved. This 
was notwithstanding the fact that France and Germany had presented a joint compromise 
proposal to narrow the scope of the digital services tax proposal, with a view to targeting 
exclusively companies engaged in online advertising. Similarly, at the March 2019 ECOFIN 
meeting, Member States again did not reach agreement on the proposed digital advertising tax, 
which was effectively a watered-down version of the Commission’s digital services tax 
proposal. This was due to opposition by Nordic countries and Ireland. The Romanian 
Presidency noted that Member States and the Council will continue to work in this area in order 
to reach consensus before the G20’s summit in Osaka, in June 2019.  
 
In any case, whether this or another watered-down version of the European Commission’s 
digital tax proposals will be eventually approved, or whether these controversial proposals will 
follow the fate of the beleaguered proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax remains to be seen.  
 
In any case, any Commission proposals that include uniform rules on calculating the tax base 
and imposing tax rates are likely to meet with strong resistance from Member States. Whilst 
the impending departure from the EU of one of the most powerful Eurosceptic Member States 
might weaken this resistance,94 in the absence of international convergence on what should be 
included in a tax base and what should be the (minimum) tax rate, it is unlikely that there will 
be large scale tax harmonizing action in the EU. The lack of legislative bases and the need for 
unanimity certainly do not help. Of course, if the European Commission ever manages to 
convince all Member States (or at least enough to activate the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism) to adopt the CCTB, this could pave the way for more uniformity as far as corporate 
tax rates are concerned - or at least the introduction of a minimum corporate tax rate. 
 
Arguably, the European Commission might not even need to await for the introduction of the 
CCTB in order to politically manoeuvre a uniform tax rate or a minimum tax rate. Recently, 
                                                          
91 For example, even Germany had its misgivings about the initial proposal after automakers expressed concern 
they would be hit by the tax. See report available at: https://www.dw.com/en/taxes-coming-to-big-data-in-
germany/a-43972540  
92 See Draft Report on the proposal for a Council directive on the common system of a digital services tax on 
revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services (COM(2018)0148 – C8-0137/2018 – 
2018/0073(CNS)). Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-627.911%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN  
93 Ibid. Other amendments included a rate increase from 3% to 5% and a broadening of the scope to cover the 
supply of digital content and online sales. 
94 Ironically, the UK is considering introducing unilateral rules for the taxation of the digital economy. See, for 
example, the UK Treasury’s Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper (November 2017) and 
Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper Update (March 2018), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/corporate-tax-and-the-digital-economy-position-paper 
there have been reports that the European Commission will soon propose the abandonment of 
the unanimity rule on tax issues so as to promote more efficient law-making.95 In a letter of 
intent96 accompanying his annual State of the Union address,97 Juncker said that the European 
Commission would issue a communication identifying areas for a move to qualified majority 
voting in the field of taxation in 2019. Juncker had first announced his desire to end the practice 
of unanimity voting on tax issues in September 2017,98 but no further action was taken. Whilst 
this matter is highly political, a complete abandonment of Member States’ fiscal veto is highly 
unlikely. It is more likely that the European Commission will propose qualified majority voting 
for a limited set of tax issues, such as legislative proposals on tax returns.  
 
 




Most corporate tax systems contain rules which prevent their abuse. Often, the more 
sophisticated the corporate tax system, the more sophisticated and complex the anti-abuse rules 
of the system are likely to be. As the European Union does not have a harmonized and 
comprehensive corporate tax system other than the de minimis and ad hoc rules briefly 
discussed in part I, one would not expect to find any self-standing anti-abuse rules other than 
those encompassed in the context of these de minimis rules. Nevertheless, the European 
Commission seized on the political momentum generated by the OECD/G20’s BEPS project 
and its aftermath, and produced a proposal for a wide range of common anti-abuse rules which 
was eventually approved in Council. This was the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD).  
 
The ATAD was part of the European Commission’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, which was 
published in January 2016.99 This Package emanated from the European Commission’s 
ambitious agenda for a fairer, simpler and more effective corporate tax system in the EU. This 
approach to anti-abuse issues was foreshadowed in the European Commission’s Action Plan 
for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System, which was published in June 2015, a few months 
before the OECD/G20 BEPS Final Reports were themselves published.100 The Action Plan had 
been released as a Commission Communication101 and was intended to improve the corporate 
tax environment in the European Union, making it fairer, more efficient and more growth-
friendly. The key actions included a strategy to relaunch the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (as explained in the previous section) and a framework for effective taxation where 
profits are generated, largely premised on the OECD/G20’s BEPS conclusions. It was not a 
major surprise, therefore, when the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package was published early in 2016.  
 
                                                          
95 Elodie Lamer, “EU to Identify Tax Matters for Qualified Majority Voting”, 91 Tax Notes Int'l 1250 (Sep. 17, 
2018) 
96 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-letter-of-intent_en.pdf 
97 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf  
98 See Elodie Lamer, “News Analysis: Is the End Near for the Unanimity Rule for EU Tax Issues?”, 2017 WTD 
179-1 
99 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package_en See analysis in 
Christiana HJI Panayi, “The Europeanisation of Good Tax Governance”, 36 (2018) 1 Yearbook of European Law 
442-495, part III (C)  
100 The BEPS Final Reports were released on 5 October 2015. See http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-2015-final-
reports.htm  
101 Commission Communication, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas 
for Action, COM(2015) 302 final (17 June 2015). 
This Package consisted of seven parts: a proposed Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive;102 a 
Recommendation on the implementation of the BEPS recommendations on tax treaty abuse 
and on permanent establishments;103 a proposed amendment to the Mutual Assistance Directive 
to include mandatory country-by-country reporting requirements;104 a general policy 
Communication;105 a Communication on an EU external strategy for effective taxation;106 a 
European Commission Staff Working Document;107 and a Study on Aggressive Tax 
Planning.108  
 
In the initial ATAD proposal,109 the European Commission proposed action in three areas 
covered by the BEPS proposals; namely, hybrid mismatches,110 interest restrictions,111 and 
CFC rules.112 The European Commission also proposed action in three areas not covered by 
the BEPS Action plan, namely: a general-anti-abuse rule (GAAR), a switch-over clause and 
rules to tackle exit taxation. Political agreement on the Directive was finally reached on 17 
June 2016, after several amendments and the deletion of the switch-over clause from the 
Directive.113 On 12 July 2016, the Council of the European Union formally adopted the new 
version of the ATAD.114  
 
Pursuant to ATAD, all taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax in a Member State, including 
subsidiaries of companies based in third countries will - from the date the provisions of the 
directive become effective-115 be scrutinised on the basis of the five anti-abuse rules.116 ATAD 
now provides for uniform (but de minimis) interest limitation rules to prevent multinational 
groups from artificially shifting their debt to jurisdictions with more generous deductibility 
rules; exit taxation rules to ensure that where a taxpayer moves assets or its tax residence out 
of the tax jurisdiction of a State, that State taxes the economic value of any capital gain created 
in its territory even though that gain has not yet been realised at the time of the exit;  a GAAR 
to cover gaps that may exist in Member State’s specific anti-abuse rules; CFC rules to prevent 
                                                          
102 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the 
functioning of the internal market, COM/2016/026 final. 
103 Commission Recommendation of 28.1.2016 on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse, 
C(2016) 271 final. 
104 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange 
of information in the field of taxation, COM/2016/025 final - 2016/010 (CNS) 
105 Commission Communication, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards Delivering Effective 
Taxation and Greater Tax Transparency in the EU, COM(2016) 23 final 
106 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an External Strategy for 
Effective Taxation, COM(2016) 24 final 
107 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council – Anti Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards delivering 
effective taxation and greater tax transparency in the EU, SWD/2016/06 final 
108 Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators, Final Report (Taxation Papers, Working Paper 
No. 61 – 2015) 
109 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules against Tax Avoidance Practices 
that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, COM(2016) 26 final (28 Jan. 2016). 
110 Action 2 of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project 
111 Action 4 of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project 
112 Action 3 of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project 
113 Directive 16/1164/EU [2016] OJ L193/1. 
114 Council Directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying Down Rules against Tax Avoidance Practices that 
Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, J L 193 (2016), EU Law IBFD. 
115 Technically, Member States have until 31 December 2018 to transpose the ATAD into their national laws and 
regulations, except for the exit taxation rules, for which they have until 31 December 2019. Member States that 
have targeted rules that are equally effective to the interest limitation rules may apply them until the OECD reaches 
an agreement on a minimum standard, or until 1 January 2024 at the latest.  
116 Art 1 
the shifting of large amounts of profits towards controlled subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions; 
and rules on hybrid mismatches to prevent corporate taxpayers from taking advantage of 
disparities between national tax systems in order to reduce their overall tax liability. The scope 
of this latter provision was further broadened to include provisions against hybrid mismatch 
arrangements with third countries.117 
 
Overall, most of these provisions seem to be out of place, and rather paradoxical given the 
framework in which they were supplanted. For example, whilst there are no harmonised rules 
as to what gains should be taxable in a Member State and what the tax rate should be, there is 
a provision to ensure that if such gains are taxable in the Member State of origin (of the 
taxpayer), then part of the economic value of the gain should be rewarded to that Member State 
when a taxpayer becomes non-resident, even if that gain is not yet realised at that point.118 
Similarly, whilst EU law does not provide for specific anti-avoidance rules other than the 
ATAD rules and those in the context of the directives, nevertheless, there is a general anti-
avoidance rule to ensure no gaps are left by domestic anti-abuse rules. Furthermore, whilst 
there is no EU requirement for a minimum corporate tax rate, or at least not yet, there are now 
provisions which effectively penalise a company from owning and controlling subsidiaries in 
low-tax jurisdictions. Finally, whilst there are no common corporate tax rules other than those 
set out in the directives discussed above, nevertheless benefitting from mismatches in the 
national tax legislations of Member States leading to double non-taxation is now against EU 
law.  
 
There is also a further, more general criticism. If the EU does not have the competence to 
harmonise direct tax legislation (including corporate tax legislation) and is restricted to ad hoc 
targeted solutions, then how can it harmonise the exception to these otherwise unharmonised 
rules? Arguably, as far as the ATAD was concerned, competence was conceded as all Member 
States agreed to the proposal - some more reluctantly than others. It is, however, unfortunate 
that EU law was the medium used to transpose into national legislation BEPS-related measures, 
which were quite extrinsic to the EU legal system up to that point. As is shown below, this 
potentially causes further uncertainties in this area, as some of the legislative provisions are at 
odds with established case law of the Court of Justice.  
 
In addition to these targeted anti-abuse rules, anti-abuse clauses long existed in the context of 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Merger Directive and the Interest and Royalties 
Directive.119 The aim of these clauses is to prevent the reliefs provided under the Directives 
from being abused. For example, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalties 
                                                          
117 This was following a further proposal by the Commission. See Proposal for a Council Directive amending 
Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, COM(2016)687 final. Apart from 
closing the loopholes as a result of the rules not being applied to third country taxpayers, one important reason for 
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the hybrid provisions would not only apply to mismatch arrangements within the EU, but also to mismatches 
arising in relation to third countries. The hybrid provisions would also deal with mismatches involving PEs, 
imported mismatches, hybrid transfers and dual resident mismatches. This proposed amendment to ATAD (also 
often referred to as ATAD II) was adopted in May 2017. Member States have until 31 December 2019, to adopt 
and rules to implement ATAD II. In line with the compromise agreement, the adopted ATAD II Directive includes 
a carve-out option through to 31 December 2022, for hybrid regulatory capital in the banking sector, and a carve-
out for financial traders involving hybrid transfers made in the ordinary course of business. 
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pre-determined amount in 5 yearly instalments. There are no provisions for reductions in value. 
119 See Art 1(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive; Art 5 of the Interest and Royalties Directive; Art 15 of the 
Merger Directive 
Directive allow domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of fraud 
or abuse.120 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive also contains a provision which prevents reliefs 
from being granted in situations of mismatches in the tax treatment of profit distributions which 
would lead to double non-taxation.121 Furthermore, under the recently enacted Tax Dispute 
Resolution Directive, a Member State may deny access to a dispute resolution procedure in 
cases where penalties were imposed in that Member State in relation to adjusted income or 
capital for tax fraud, wilful default and gross negligence.122 
 
It should be emphasised that up until the ATAD’s anti-abuse rules were introduced, the anti-
abuse provisions of the relevant directives constituted the only anti-abuse legislation existing 
at the time. In fact, up until very recently, the focus of attention of most EU institutions and 
mostly the European Commission and the Court of Justice was on whether Member State anti-
abuse rules were compatible with fundamental freedoms and the non-discrimination principle 
in general. The high watermark of this approach was the Court’s judgment in the Cadbury 
Schweppes case.123 
 
This was the first important case that dealt with CFC regimes, and the focus was on the UK 
rules existing at the time. According to the legislation, a resident company was subject to 
corporation tax on its worldwide profits, which, at the time, included the profits of a foreign 
branch124 but not the profits of a foreign subsidiary. Broadly, a UK parent company was taxed 
on the profits of the foreign subsidiary only when they were distributed to it as dividends. 
Where the UK CFC legislation was triggered, the profits of a foreign subsidiary were attributed 
to the UK parent company at the time at which the profits arose and were taxed with a credit 
for the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary. If the subsidiary subsequently distributed a dividend, 
this tax could be credited against the tax payable by the parent company on the dividend. 
 
In this case, Cadbury Schweppes, a UK company, indirectly held 100% of the shares of two 
Irish subsidiaries. These subsidiaries were subject to a 10% corporate tax rate under the 
International Financial Services Centre regime in Dublin,125 which was lower than the UK tax 
rate. As none of the exemptions under the UK CFC rules applied, Cadbury Schweppes was 
taxed by the UK tax authorities on the profits of its Irish subsidiaries. The case was eventually 
referred to the Court of Justice. 
 
The Court of Justice held that the UK legislation had to be examined in light of the freedom of 
establishment only.126 It was found that the UK CFC rules restricted the freedom of 
establishment because the profits of a controlled company were only attributed to the UK 
parent company when this controlled company was incorporated in a low-tax Member State, 
within the meaning of the UK CFC rules. Profits were not attributed to the UK parent if the 
                                                          
120 See Art 1(2) of Parent-Subsidiary Directive; Art 5 of Interest and Royalties Directive 
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122  Art 16(6) 
123 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995 
124 Under the current UK regime, branches can now be exempt. 
125 This regime has now been phased out. 
126 It was explained that the UK CFC rules applied to resident companies that had a controlling holding in their 
subsidiary established outside the United Kingdom. This gave the resident company definite influence over the 
subsidiary’s decisions and allowed the resident companies to determine the subsidiary’s activities. Although the 
rules had restrictive effects on the free movement of services and the free movement of capital, such effects were 
an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on the freedom of establishment. Cadbury Schweppes, at paras. 31-
33.  
controlled company was a UK resident.127 Such a difference of treatment dissuaded UK-
resident companies from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member State 
with such a lower level of taxation and therefore constituted a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment.128 
 
This restriction was justified on the basis of prevention of tax avoidance and evasion. It was 
emphasized that the mere fact that a resident company established a secondary establishment 
such as a subsidiary in another Member State could not justify a general presumption of tax 
evasion.129 A national measure restricting the freedom of establishment could only be justified 
when it specifically related to “wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic 
reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities 
carried out on national territory”.130 
 
Although the UK CFC rules were suitable for the attainment of this objective, they also had to 
be proportional. The CFC rules had to exclude from their scope situations whereby, despite the 
existence of tax motives, the arrangements reflected economic reality.  
 
This reasoning was followed in numerous cases.131 Later cases emphasised that, as regards 
proportionality, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity, without being subject to undue 
administrative constraints to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may 
have been for that transaction.132 Also, where there is re-characterisation of an interest 
payment, this re-characterisation should be limited to the proportion of that interest which 
exceeds the arm’s length amount.133  
 
What is evident from this brief exposition is that, hitherto, in most cases litigated at the Court 
of Justice, the emphasis was mostly on the compatibility of national anti-abuse provisions with 
EU law and not the protection of the tax bases of Member States. Very importantly, this appears 
to be the approach even in the post-BEPS era, although there are calls for the Court of Justice 
to be more attuned to the risk of tax avoidance or double non-taxation.134 In recent cases dealing 
with the anti-abuse provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it was reiterated that such 
provisions should still be targeted against wholly artificial arrangements and should not be too 
broadly phrased. In the Eqiom & Enka case,135 it was emphasised that there cannot be an initial 
presumption of abuse where an EU parent company was controlled by shareholders in third 
states. A similar conclusion was reached in the Diester Holding case.136  
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131 See chapter 8 in HJI Panayi (2013), fn.41. See, also, Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas (2006) - CFC Rules Under EU Tax Law’, in John Snape & Dominic de Cogan, Landmark 
Cases in Revenue Law (Hart Publishing, 2019); Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The ATAD’s CFC Rule and its Impact 
on the Existing Regimes of EU Member States’, in Pasquale Pistone & Dennis Weber eds, The Implementation 
of Anti-BEPS Rules in the EU: A Comprehensive Study (IBFD, 2018). 
132 Case C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-2107 
133 Ibid. 
134 See Case C-28/17 NN A/S, where Advocate General Campos argued that the restriction is justified by the 
prevention of double deduction of losses, a justification that is especially pertinent following the OECD BEPS 
project and Art 2 of the ATAD Directive on hybrid mismatches. See paras 65-73. Whilst the Court of Justice 
agreed on the issue of justification, it did not refer to the BEPS project or any other instruments.  
135 Case C-6/16 Eqiom & Enka 
136 See Joined Cases C-504/16 Deister Holding and C-613/16 Juhler Holding.  
Where does this discord leave us as far as a harmonised corporate tax base is concerned? 
Certainly, anti-abuse rules are crucial to any system as they protect the corporate tax base. 
However, the co-existence of the current ad hoc anti-abuse rules (whether as part of other 
directives or as substantive provisions in the ATAD) with the principles derived from the case 
law of the Court of Justice appears to be contradictory. The author has argued elsewhere that 
some of the provisions of the ATAD may not be aligned with the case law of the Court of 
Justice.137 Broadly, the scope of the anti-abuse rules in the directives (and especially in the 
ATAD) tends to be rather broad, placing the burden of proof on taxpayers. However, case law 
suggests that national anti-abuse rules should be targeted against wholly artificial 
arrangements, thus shifting the burden of proof on the tax authorities to show that this is the 
case. In fact, as part of the proportionality assessment, the case law requires that taxpayers be 
given the opportunity to prove the commerciality of the arrangement. These contradictory 
positions are not conducive to legal certainty. Rather, they jeopardise any future attempts to 








Apart from the above legislation on anti-abuse rules and the relevant case law– often 
contradictory, as I explained - there is a combination of soft law and hard law for the regulation 
of transfer pricing. For a long time, the Arbitration Convention was a key instrument. This was 
a multilateral convention signed by all Member States, dealing with the elimination of double 
taxation arising from transfer pricing adjustments and the settlement disputes between Member 
State competent authorities on the basis of the arm’s length principle.138 Guidance was given 
on the implementation of the Convention through soft law instruments,139 many of which were 
produced by the European Commission’s Joint Transfer Pricing Forum.140 The new Tax 
Dispute Resolution Directive Convention does not officially replace the Arbitration 
Convention but certainly provides a more efficient route for taxpayers to take in resolving their 
tax disputes with competent authorities.  
 
The Court of Justice has considered transfer pricing issues in two cases referred to it. Both 
cases were decided in a rather conservative way. In the first case dealing with transfer pricing 
rules, the SGI case,141 it was questioned whether the Belgian rules were compatible with the 
non-discrimination provision, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.  
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138 Convention 90/436/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the 
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises 
139 E.g. the Code of Conduct for the effective implementation of the EU Arbitration Convention. This Code of 
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140 See, Report on the Application of the Profit Split Method within the EU (2019); Report on the Use of 
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141 Case C-311/08 Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) v. État belge [2010] ECR I-487 
 Here, a Belgian holding company, Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI), made an interest-
free loan to a French subsidiary and paid management expenses to a Luxembourg corporate 
shareholder, who was also the director and managing director of SGI. For the interest-free loan, 
the Belgian tax authorities added a notional interest payment to SGI’s tax base and for the 
management fees, the tax authorities refused to allow a business expense deduction. SGI 
challenged these assessments and the case was referred to the Court of Justice. 
 
The Court of Justice found that the Belgian legislation restricted the freedom of 
establishment142 but it was justified on the basis of preserving the balanced allocation of taxing 
powers between Member States.143 The Court of Justice also found the legislation to be justified 
on the basis of preventing tax avoidance, even though the national legislation was not 
specifically designed against purely artificial arrangements.144 In the judgment, the Court used 
inconsistent terms to identify tax avoidance.145 
 
In any case, for the legislation to be proportional, two grounds had to be satisfied. First, in each 
occasion where there was a suspicion that a transaction went beyond what the companies would 
have agreed under fully competitive conditions, the taxpayer had to be given an opportunity, 
without being subject to undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any 
commercial justification that there may have been for that transaction.146 Secondly, where the 
consideration of such elements led to the conclusion that the transaction went beyond what the 
companies would have agreed under fully competitive conditions, the corrective tax measure 
had to be confined to the part which exceeded what would have been agreed if the companies 
did not have a relationship of interdependence.147 The Court of Justice concluded that it was 
for the referring court to decide whether the Belgian legislation went beyond what was 
necessary to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation, taken together.148 
 
In another recent case on transfer pricing, the Hornbach-Baumarkt case,149 it was questioned 
whether the German transfer pricing legislation was compatible with the freedom of 
establishment. The legislation applied only to cross-border situations and did not allow the 
taxpayer to rely on commercial reasons resulting from its status as a shareholder of the foreign 
subsidiary. In this case, a German parent company had given guarantees and letters of comfort 
to banks with respect to loans made to foreign subsidiaries, but without requiring any payment 
or consideration. The German tax authorities adjusted the profits of the parent company 
upwards and the parent company challenged this decision. The case was eventually referred to 
the Court of Justice which concluded that there was no incompatibility.  
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146 SGI, para 71 
147 Ibid, para 72 
148 Ibid, para 75 
149 Case C-382/16 Hornbach-Baumarkt 
The Court of Justice found that the transfer pricing legislation constituted a restriction to the 
freedom of establishment.150 This restriction was justified by the need to preserve the balanced 
allocation of taxing rights between the Member States, provided that the transfer pricing 
legislation was aimed at preventing profit shifting via transactions that were not in accordance 
with market conditions. The Court did not consider whether the restriction was justified on the 
basis of preventing tax avoidance, as no such argument had been advanced.151 
 
The Court of Justice went on to examine the proportionality of the German transfer pricing 
legislation and to clarify the meaning of the concept of “commercial justification”. It was 
questioned whether this concept included economic reasons resulting from the very existence 
of a relationship of interdependence between the parent company and its subsidiaries which 
were resident in another Member State.152 The Court of Justice found that there may be a 
commercial justification by virtue of the fact that the taxpayer was a shareholder in the foreign 
group companies, which would justify the conclusion of the transaction under non-arm’s length 
terms.153 As the gratuitous granting of comfort letters containing a guarantee statement could 
be explained by the economic interest of the shareholder in the financial success of the foreign 
group subsidiaries, this could be sufficient commercial justification. As such, the German 
legislation did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the objective pursued, to the extent 
that “the authorities responsible for the enforcement of that legislation afford the resident 
taxpayer the opportunity to prove that the terms were agreed on for commercial reasons which 
could result from its status as a shareholder in the non-resident company, which is a matter for 
the referring court to assess”.154 
 
This is a very important decision. Contrary to the advice of the Advocate General, the Court of 
Justice did not rely on tax avoidance or profit shifting reasons to justify the legislation. Rather, 
its acceptance of commercial justification and what that encompasses could pave the way for 
what the Advocate General warned to be “a blunt and full exclusion of any business 
transactions with subsidiaries from the application of the [arm’s length] principle, because a 
parent will always have interest in seeing its subsidiary prosper”.155 
 
By not insisting on wholly artificial arrangements, both cases seem to confirm that the Court 
of Justice is taking a slightly different approach than under other anti-abuse rules. Perhaps this 
is understandable, as there is much more developed international soft law – or at least 
international convergence on some concepts – which is set out in the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. However, this does not mean that the Court of Justice will eschew any discussion 
or challenge over some provisions of, or practices under, national transfer pricing regimes, 
even if those provisions or practices emanate from established principles under the OECD’s 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. It would seem that this is encouraged by the European 
Commission, if one considers the recent state aid challenges over the transfer pricing practices 
of some Member States.  
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The prohibition on state aids (Art 107 TFEU) is another EU treaty provision that has had a 
huge impact on transfer pricing. This provision applies when there is an aid in the sense of a 
benefit or advantage, granted by a Member State or through Member State resources. The aid 
must favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (the ‘selectivity’ principle), 
it must distort or threaten to distort competition, and must be capable of affecting trade between 
Member States. 
 
The state aid prohibition has become very important in the tax field. Measures that relieve the 
recipients of charges that are normally borne from their budgets,156 such as reductions in the 
tax base, total or partial reduction in the amount of tax (exemption or tax credit), deferment, 
cancellation or even special rescheduling of tax debts are, according to the European 
Commission, examples of state aid.157 Such measures mitigate the charge that would normally 
be recoverable from the undertaking. A company may be affected by the state aid prohibition 
whether it is the recipient of aid or the competitor of such company.158 Aid given to a company 
may have to be repaid if it is unlawful or has not been properly notified or approved by the 
European Commission. If repayment is demanded, the taxpayer will have to reimburse the full 
amount of the financial benefit within a period of four months, including interest, for up to a 
maximum of 10 years prior to the start of an investigation. No recovery is necessary when the 
unlawful aid was paid more than 10 years before the European Commission’s decision.  
 
The European Commission has a pivotal role in the application of the state aid regime.159 It 
keeps constant review of existing aids offered by Member States.160 Furthermore, Member 
States are required to notify the European Commission as to any plans to grant or alter state 
aid.161 The European Commission may also ask the Court of Justice to order a Member State 
to recover illegal state aid.162 
 
In the last few years, the state aid prohibition has been used by the European Commission to 
challenge transfer pricing practices of Member States, in that they selectively conferred 
advantages to some multinationals. The first high-profile investigations were launched by the 
European Commission in the summer of 2014, to examine whether certain multinational 
companies had received transfer pricing tax rulings which led to significant tax reductions (or 
no taxation altogether) in violation of the state aid rules. The MNEs and jurisdictions involved 
were Apple in Ireland, Starbucks in the Netherlands and Fiat and Amazon in Luxembourg. 
Many more cases followed suit. Some cases are still being investigated by the European 
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Commission, but other cases are under appeal in the Court of Justice after the European 
Commission delivered its decisions.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the specific details of all the investigations. 
Broadly, the crux of the matter in most of the cases investigated was whether the tax rulings 
given by the relevant Member States allowed the MNE beneficiaries to depart from market 
conditions in setting the commercial conditions (and pricing) of intra-group transactions, which 
led to the renunciation of tax revenue by Member States and as a corollary of Member State 
resources. The premise of the European Commission’s opening decisions in the initial cases 
seemed to be that the existence of advantage and selectivity was satisfied when the arm’s length 
principle of the OECD Model Tax Convention was not complied with.163 In later decisions, the 
European Commission refined its reasoning by finding that the impugned arrangements 
derogated from normal practices under domestic law and the arm’s length principle as 
encompassed under EU state aid rules. As such, “the arm’s-length principle therefore 
necessarily forms part of the European Commission’s assessment under Article 107(1)”.164 In 
other words, the European Commission considered that the arm’s length principle was neither 
the one derived from Art 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, nor the one under domestic 
rules, but rather a general principle under Article 107 (1) TFEU that prevented distortion of 
competition.  
 
At the time of writing, the Court of Justice had not yet delivered any judgments on any of the 
cases under appeal.165 Nevertheless, on the basis of established166 and recent167 case law in this 
area, it seems that even though Member States are thought to have retained competence in 
regulating their corporate tax systems, in fact, they are very restricted as to what type of tax 
incentives they can give - whether through transfer pricing rulings, or advance pricing 
agreements, or the tax system as a whole. As noted earlier, basic concepts of transfer pricing 
and especially the arm’s length principle remain in the realm of soft law – which is set out in 
the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines - and are very 
much respected by the Court of Justice under the case law discussed in this section. This case 
law is, however, rather limited and based on fundamental freedoms, the theoretical 
                                                          
163 See analysis in chapter 7, HJI Panayi (2015), fn.21 
164 See, e.g. Belgian excess profits decision, para 150 (Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1699 of 11 January 2016 
on the excess profit exemption State aid scheme SA.37667 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) implemented by Belgium 
(notified under document C(2015) 9837), OJ L 260, 27.9.2016, p. 61–103); the Starbucks final decision, para 264 
(Commission Decision (EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) 
implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks (notified under document C(2015) 7143), OJ L 83, 29.3.2017, p. 
38–115); the Fiat Finance final decision, para 228 (Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2326 of 21 October 2015 on 
State aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) which Luxembourg granted to Fiat (notified under document C(2015) 
7152), OJ L 351, 22.12.2016, p. 1–67) etc. For commentary, see Ruth Bonnici, The European Commission’s 
Arm’s Length Standard: Relationship and Compatibility with the Arm’s Length Principle under Transfer Pricing, 
26 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 1 (2019), Journals IBFD. 
165 On 14 February 2019, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision in the Belgian excess profits case 
(Cases T-131/16 & T-263//16) as it failed to demonstrate why the selected sample was representative. The General 
Court found that a more detailed review was required. As the General Court did not invalidate the Commission’s 
substantive interpretation of the State aid rules, but rather challenged the methodology of assessment and the 
classification of the aid as a “scheme”, this ruling might not have an impact on the currently pending cases and 
the Commission’s interpretation of the arm’s length principle is still to be examined. See HJI Panayi, in Gore-
Browne EU Company Law, chapter 19[5A], fn. 28 
166 See HJI Panayi (2015), fn.21, chapter 7, and case law discussed. 
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v Spain. See analysis in Christiana HJI Panayi, in Gore-Browne, EU Company Law, chapter 19, part 19[5C], fn. 
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underpinnings of which are very different. If the arm’s length principle is eventually interpreted 
by the Court of Justice as being encompassed in the Treaty state aid prohibition, this could 
mean that EU law will, in the future, have a decisive role in what is and what is not an arm’s 
length arrangement. In other words, there may well be significant EU interference in the 




V. IS THERE AN EU TAX ADMINISTRATION? 
 
 
All corporate tax systems have to be administered or at least overseen by a central tax authority.  
As shown in this article, the development of a body of corporate tax law in the European Union 
has been rather random and in times contradictory – the product of (often opportunistic) 
reactions to certain political exigencies rather than a carefully constructed system. Therefore, 
the lack of some form of central EU tax administration is hardly surprising. This is one of the 
areas with the least progress, as shown in this part of the article. In fact, even in the context of 
the most ambitious European Commission legislative tax proposal (the CCCTB proposal) most 
of the proposed administrative functions depend on Member State tax administrations and 
cooperation between them. The European Commission merely has an ad hoc role.  
 
 
A. THE FRAGMENTED LANDSCAPE 
 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of a central EU tax administration, nevertheless, there has long 
existed EU secondary legislation which provides for Member State cooperation in the form of 
exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes. In the absence of a central 
tax authority to oversee compliance with this legislation, the correct enforcement of the rules 
is left to be policed by the European Commission (through its infringement actions)168 and the 
Court of Justice. Taxpayers do not tend to complain about lax enforcement of such rules, unless 
it affects a competitor.   
 
The pertinent rules in this area are encompassed in the Mutual Assistance directives which deal 
with the recovery of taxes169 and with exchange of information.170 As the title of these 
instruments suggests, the Directives allow tax authorities from one Member State to seek 
assistance from another Member State. These Directives are not exclusively relevant to 
companies, as they have a wide scope of application. In fact, initially, these directives were 
primarily used to deal with emigrating individuals leaving outstanding tax bills, but nowadays 
they are increasingly relevant to companies.171 
 
Under the current version of the Mutual Assistance Directive for the recovery of taxes, a 
Member State (through its competent authority) may request assistance from another Member 
                                                          
168 See Article 267 TFEU 
169 Council Directive 2010/24/EU, fn. 25  
170 Council Directive 2011/16/EU, fn. 25   
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State for the recovery172 of all taxes and duties levied by the first Member State and all its 
territorial or administrative subdivisions.173 A Member State may also request for any 
information which is foreseeably relevant to the applicant authority in the recovery of its 
claims.174 Under limited circumstances, there can be exchange of information without any prior 
request.175 The Directive also provides for assistance for precautionary measures to be imposed 
by the other Member State,176 as well as for the notification of certain documents relating to 
claims.177 
 
Under the Mutual Assistance Directive for the recovery of taxes, assistance is primarily based 
on a prior request by one Member State to another. If the relevant Member States agree, 
officials of one Member State may be present and participate in administrative enquiries, and 
court proceedings in the other Member State.178 This provision has not often been used but it 
is being explored by the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum as far as joint audits are concerned.179 
Broadly, however, the procedure in this directive is very much governed by Member States 
and there is no EU institutional interference.  
 
There is a similar procedure for cooperation under the Mutual Assistance directive on exchange 
of information which in 2011 was renamed as Directive on administrative cooperation 
(DAC).180 The 2011 version of the Directive introduced an important provision for automatic 
exchange of information. Heavily influenced by the US FATCA legislation181 and the success 
of the now obsolete EU’s Savings Directive,182 it was stipulated that from 1st January 2015, 
there would be automatic exchange of information for five types of income: namely, income 
from employment, director’s fees, life insurance products not covered by other Directives, 
                                                          
172 Council Directive 2010/24/EU, Art 10 
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pensions, ownership of and income from immovable property.183 Whilst at the time this and 
other provisions184 of the new DAC were hailed as ground-breaking, by the time they became 
effective more amendments began to be introduced for more extensive automatic exchange of 
information.  
 
The first major amendment was agreed in 2014,185 in the midst of the international tax 
community’s frantic engagement in the OECD/G20’s BEPS project. This amendment 
introduced automatic exchange of financial account information, similar to the OECD’s 
Common Reporting Standard.186  
 
The second amendment was agreed the following year following the revelations of the 
Luxembourg Leaks187 and the launch of several European Commission state aid investigations 
into transfer pricing rulings given by Member States to multinationals.188 The 2015 amendment 
introduced a very bold provision for automatic exchange of information on tax rulings and 
advance pricing agreements,189 under certain conditions.190 Whilst this amendment may have 
been inspired by the recommendations of the OECD/G20 under Action 5 of the BEPS 
Project191 and the subsequent elevation of these recommendations into the status of a minimum 
standard,192 the EU amendment went much further than this minimum standard by providing 
for automatic rather than spontaneous exchange of this information.  
 
It should be emphasised that none of the BEPS minimum standards are legally enforceable, not 
even by OECD member countries. Whilst there is political pressure to adopt these standards 
and/or amend domestic legislation accordingly, nevertheless no sanctions are imposed if no 
such action is taken. Nevertheless, on the pretext of complying with the OECD/G20’s BEPS 
recommendations and especially the proposals for country-by-country reporting under Action 
13,193 in 2016 a third amendment to the DAC was agreed between Member States in Council 
which introduced automatic exchange of country-by-country reports.194 Although for Member 
States this expedited the adoption of another BEPS minimum standard, again, the amendment 
went further than the recommendations under Action 13. The EU legislation very much 
                                                          
183 See Art 8 
184 See, for example, the requirement for the transmission of third country information received by one Member 
State to another when this is useful under Article 16(3), or the requirement for any wider cooperation provided by 
a Member State to a third country to be extended to other Member States (the most-favour-national clause) under 
Article 19 etc. 
185 Directive 2014/107/EU 
186 See Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information Report, available on: 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-
financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page1 
187 On the Luxembourg Leaks, see https://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks 
188 See HJI Panayi (2015), fn.21, chapter 7 
189 Directive 2015/2376/EU 
190 See HJI Panayi (2018), fn.99, Part III.C.IV and HJI Panayi, in Gore-Browne, chapter 18, part 18[17], fn. 4.  
191 Action 5 aimed to develop rules to counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account 
transparency and substance. There were two important components of the OECD’s proposals; firstly, the 
methodology to define the substantial activity requirement in the context of intangible property (the nexus 
approach) and, secondly, the proposed framework for compulsory spontaneous exchange of tax rulings.  
192 For an overview of the minimum standards, see fn. 37. 
193 Under Action 13 of the Action Plan, the OECD was to: “Develop rules regarding transfer pricing 
documentation to enhance transparency for tax administration, taking into account the compliance costs for 
business. The rules to be developed [would] include a requirement that MNEs provide all relevant governments 
with needed information on their global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes paid among 
countries according to a common template.” 
194 Directive 2016/881/EU 
facilitated and enhanced the process of country-by-country reporting by removing the need to 
exchange such information through the more burdensome and lengthy (mostly bilateral) tax 
treaty mechanisms. In fact, there have also been calls for the information exchanges to be made 
public, though this Commission proposal195 has not (yet) been approved. 
 
The fourth amendment, agreed more recently in 2018, introduced automatic exchange 
of reportable cross-border arrangements in order to disclose potentially aggressive tax planning 
arrangements.196 Again, this was heavily influenced by Action 12 of the OECD/G20’s BEPS 
project, which, however, was not one of the minimum standards. 
 
These recent amendments have significantly enhanced and simplified cooperation between 
Member States by making automatic exchange of information more mainstream. To an extent, 
the ‘automation’ of information exchanges takes away the need for a prior request from one 
Member State to another – with all its associated delays and the  potential legal obstacles that 
could arise in fulfilling that request.  Of course, there could still be requests in the traditional 
way for further information not included in what has been automatically exchanged. However, 
for important categories of information, the procedure for exchange has largely been taken 
outside the scope of the administrative powers of Member States.  
 
Whilst it cannot be said that the oversight of this procedure and the corollary competence has 
now been shifted to a Union institution, nevertheless, one cannot help but acknowledge the 
increasingly important role of the European Commission in this area. Notably, under the 
amendments mentioned above, automatically exchanged information on tax rulings and 
advanced pricing agreements and automatically exchanged information on reportable cross-
border arrangements will be stored in a central directory which is to be developed by the 
European Commission.197 Although there is not much information as to how these central 
                                                          
195 This initiative takes the form of a proposal to amend the Accounting Directive requiring disclosure of financial 
accounts (2013/34/EU). As such, it only requires qualified majority and not unanimity. See Proposed amendment 
to Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU) regarding disclosure of income tax information (COM(2016) 198/2). 
Under this proposal, MNEs (EU/non-EU) with a consolidated turnover of EUR 750 million would be required to 
publish annually a report disclosing the profit and the tax accrued and paid in each Member State on a country-
by-country basis for EU Member States, and in the aggregate for all non-EU countries. The information, which is 
less detailed than under the currently approved country-by-country reporting rules, would be made available in a 
stand-alone report on the company’s website and be accessible to the public for at least 5 years. Companies would 
also have to file the report with a business register in the EU. See analysis in HJI Panayi (2018), fn.99, Part IV(A). 
196 Directive 2018/822/EU. Also see recently enacted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/532 amending 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2378 as regards the standard forms, including linguistic arrangements, for 
the mandatory automatic exchange of information on reportable cross-border arrangements. For commentary, see 
Franklin Cachia, “Tax Transparency for Intermediaries: The Mandatory Disclosure Rules and Its EU Impact”, 
(2018) 4 EC Tax Review 206-217; Frans Vanistendael, “The EU Directive on Aggressive Tax Planning: The 
Wrong Approach,” Tax Analysts, Dec 3 2018, p.995; Roman Seer and Sascha Kargitta, ‘Exchange of Information 
and Cooperation in Direct Taxation’, in Research Handbook in European Union Taxation Law (Elgar Publishing, 
forthcoming) chapter 22. 
197 Under the provisions of the Directive introducing automatic exchange of information on rulings and advance 
pricing agreements (Directive 2015/2376/EU), the central directory will be “accessible to all Member States and 
the Commission, to which Member States would upload and store information, instead of exchanging that 
information by secured email”. See para 19, preamble. The practical arrangements necessary for the establishment 
of such a directory are to be adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
26(2) of Directive 2011/16/EU. See amendments to paras 3 and 5 of Art 21 of DAC. Similarly, under the 
provisions of the Directive introducing automatic exchange of information for reportable cross-border 
arrangements (Directive 2018/822/EU), the Commission must develop and provide with technical and logistical 
support a secure Member State central directory. See Art 21(5) DAC. Also, implementing powers are conferred 
on the Commission to adopt the necessary practical arrangements for upgrading the central directory. See para 16, 
preamble. 
directories will be run, what safeguards and Chinese walls will be developed to avoid conflict 
of interests and how taxpayers’ rights will be protected, this arrangement may empower the 
European Commission to have a more strategic involvement in supra-national cooperation.  
 
The increased availability of automatic exchange of information has also fast-tracked other 
forms of supra-national cooperation. Indeed, this has been the case with money-laundering 
rules. Through another amendment to the DAC,198 tax authorities now have access to beneficial 
ownership information collected under anti-money laundering legislation (namely, the fourth 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive).199 This amendment follows an earlier proposal200 to revise 
the fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive to include a specific reference to tax crimes, as 
well as to require Member States to store beneficial ownership information in central registers 
which would be accessible to the public. Whilst the proposal for all Member States to create 
central registers of beneficial ownership information for companies, other legal entities, and 
trusts was approved, it was left to the discretion of Member States to decide whether to make 
their beneficial ownership registers public.   
 
Recently, through further amendments201 to the existing anti-money laundering legislation, 
there are now extended provisions regarding the implementation and design of ultimate 
beneficial ownership registers within the EU. Very importantly, registers of beneficial owners 
of companies operating within the EU must now be made publicly accessible and national 
registers have to be better interconnected, to facilitate co-operation between Member States. 
The revised Directive provides for extended responsibility and reporting obligations and for 
facilitated co-operation between national financial intelligence units and bank supervisors on 
exchange of information. As for third country transactions which have been identified by the 
European Commission as presenting an increased risk of money laundering, the amended 
Directive provides tougher criteria regarding the obligation to report suspicious transactions 
and heavy sanctions against violations. 
 
Apart from the above forms of administrative cooperation - there is now the Tax Dispute 
Resolution Directive which aims to facilitate the resolution of disputes between Member 
States.202 The new Directive applies, inter alia, to disputes arising from the interpretation and 
application of tax treaties leading to double taxation. The Directive broadens the scope of the 
EU rules on dispute resolution, which hitherto were limited to the Arbitration Convention and 
its focus on transfer pricing disputes. 
 
                                                          
No central directory seems to be foreseen for the automatic exchange of country-by-country information. Such 
information will be exchanged electronically through the Common Communication Network (CCN). However, 
under the newly added para 6 of Art 21 DAC, “[t]he Commission shall, by means of implementing acts, adopt the 
necessary practical arrangements for the upgrading of the CCN network”.  
198 Directive 2016/2258/EU 
199 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73). 
200 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. See release on 12 January, 2015, 
available on: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5116-2015-ADD-2/en/pdf  
201 Se text available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-72-2017-INIT/en/pdf  
202 Member States have until 30 June 2019 to transpose the directive into national laws and regulations. It will 
apply to complaints submitted after that date on questions relating to the tax year starting on or after 1 January 
2018. Member States may, however, agree to apply the Directive to complaints related to earlier tax years. 
More specifically, as set out in Article 1, the Directive lays down “rules on a mechanism to 
resolve disputes between Member States when those disputes arise from the interpretation and 
application of agreements and conventions that provide for the elimination of double taxation 
of income and, where applicable, capital”. A combined reading of the provisions of this 
Directive suggests that double taxation may not even need to have occurred for the Directive 
to be applicable. Although the Directive, stipulates that a Member State may – on a case by 
case basis – deny access to the dispute resolution procedure where the dispute does not involve 
double taxation,203 the starting point is that even disputes not involving double taxation are 
within the scope of the Directive. This is also buttressed by the preamble to this Directive.204 
Therefore, the new Directive will not only cover disputes on double taxation but could also 
cover disputes arising from the wrongful application of any of the procedural provisions (e.g. 
provisions on exchange of information, or assistance in the collection of taxes etc). 
 
Under the new Tax Dispute Resolution Directive, any person who is a tax resident of a Member 
State and whose taxation is directly affected by a matter giving rise to a dispute, may 
simultaneously submit a complaint to each of the concerned EU competent authorities.205 
Within a period of six months from having received all the necessary documents, any of the 
concerned competent authorities may decide to resolve the dispute on a unilateral basis. If that 
does not happen, then the relevant competent authorities of the Member States involved must 
endeavour to solve the dispute by means of a mutual agreement procedure within a period of 
two years.206 Any agreement reached under the mutual agreement procedure is binding on the 
competent authorities and enforceable by the taxpayer.207  
 
If no agreement is reached, then upon a request by the taxpayer to the competent authorities of 
the Member States concerned, an Advisory Commission is set up.208 The new Directive 
provides for mandatory resolution of double taxation disputes. Alternatively, Member States 
are able to request for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission instead of the Advisory 
Commission, which will again have to deal with the dispute in a binding manner.209 Taxpayers 
have several appeal possibilities to ensure that the competent authorities will apply the 
provisions of the Directive. 
 
The new Directive sets out when access to national courts should be granted for clarifying 
whether there is an obligation to eliminate double taxation and, if so, provides the national 
court with the power to take action.210 Furthermore, the new Directive allows Member States 
to choose the methods for solving their double taxation disputes provided that double taxation 
is eliminated within the timelines laid down in the Directive. In addition, the new Directive 
allows the European Commission to assist Member States in the proceedings and increases 
transparency by requiring at least the abstracts of the decisions to be published.15 The European 
Commission is, once again, tasked with the development of a central repository which will 
                                                          
203 Art 17(6) 
204 See preamble, para 6, which sets out that the resolution of disputes envisaged under this Directive, “should 
apply to different interpretation and application of bilateral tax treaties and of the Union Arbitration Convention 
— in particular to different interpretation and application leading to double taxation”. 
205 This right must be exercised within three years from the receipt of the first notification of the action resulting 
in, or that will result in the dispute. See Art 3. 
206 Art 4(1) 
207 Art 4(2) 
208 Art 6. The relevant competent authorities must also inform the taxpayer of the reasons that no agreement was 
reached. See Art 4(3). 
209 Art 10 
210 Art 16 
archive the opinions of the Advisory Commissions and of the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Commissions (either the final decisions or the abstracts) and make them available online.211 
 
Whilst the processes discussed above are still largely supra-national and dependent on 
cooperation between Member States, albeit embedded in the normative and much more easily 
enforceable context of EU law, nevertheless, one can easily detect the European Commission’s 
enhanced involvement which could lead to creeping competences. The central directories 
which are to be developed by the European Commission following the amendments to the DAC 
and the central repository of opinions under the new Tax Dispute Resolution Directive is a 
good starting point. Such central directories could eventually lead to more centralised 
administrative functions allocated to the European Commission, not just in information 
exchange but in other aspects of tax administration. 
 
Acquiring a more important role in the EU’s tax administration may not be such a big leap for 
the European Commission. As shown in part IV, the European Commission already has 
important functions of a centralised nature in the context of the state aid regime – including 
fiscal state aids. More specifically, the European Commission is the only EU institution that 
can launch state aid investigations and deliver the first instance decisions which if not appealed 
at the European courts are final and binding on Member States. The European Commission 
also develops guidelines and other types of soft law in this area.212 The recent Commission 
investigations in Member States’ transfer pricing tax rulings show just how much power the 
European Commission yields in this area. Of course the ultimate arbiter in this and many other 
areas is the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, as the investigations are launched and pursued by 
the European Commission in a largely discretionary manner,213 arguably, the European 
Commission has a great role in what aid may and may not to be scrutinised at EU level.  
 
Other older and more recent initiatives also seem to buttress the growing importance of the 
European Commission as an ad hoc EU tax administration. In the early 2000s, the European 
Commission had negotiated on behalf of the Union the EU savings taxation agreements with 
some European third countries; namely, with Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and 
Switzerland.214 These agreements were considered to be necessary to enable the Union to 
exercise its internal competence, though it was emphasised that the Union did not have 
exclusive competence215  to conclude such agreements.216 Similar bilateral savings taxation 
agreements were also signed with the dependent territories of the Netherlands and Great Britain 
                                                          
211 See Art 19 
212 See, in general: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html  
213 The Commission has substantial discretion in the overall process as it is entitled to set priorities in relation to 
state aid complaints and give differing degrees of priority. The procedure is essentially a bilateral one between 
the Commission and the Member State that has conferred the aid. There are no material procedural rights conferred 
to interested parties – whether the beneficiary of the aid or the competitor.  
214 See, generally, Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The Relationship between EU and International Tax Law’, in Research 
Handbook on EU Tax Law, fn. 19. 
215 See Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community 
and the Swiss Confederation providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 
2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments and the accompanying 
Memorandum of Understanding, COM(2004) 75 final, p.3 
216 Interestingly, about 20 years earlier, in 1983, the Commission had unsuccessfully claimed competence to 
negotiate a multilateral agreement on exchange of information with the Council of Europe, and failed to obtain a 
mandate due to the concerns of the Member States. See Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the 
Commission to negotiate a multilateral Convention on administrative assistance in tax matters within the Council 
of Europe, COM (83) 685 final, 22 November 1983. This recommendation was subsequently withdrawn on 13 
April 1988. 
(Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles and Turks and Caicos Islands), and with European tax havens 
(Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland). More recently, the European 
Commission was again entrusted to revise these agreements in order to align the regulatory 
framework of these European countries with that introduced under the 2014 amendment217  to 
the DAC,218 discussed above.   
 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the European Commission acting as a central tax 
authority is in the context of developing the EU’s external fiscal policy and more specifically 
in the creation of the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. For such initiatives, it tends 
to be assisted by other informal (and unelected) bodies, which also seem to yield substantial 
power. This is discussed next. 
 
 
B. IS THERE CENTRALISATION OF SOFT LAW FISCAL POWERS? 
 
 
Whilst there is no official central tax authority for EU tax matters, there is some unifying and 
increasingly empowering soft law generated from the European Commission or expert groups 
such as the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, the VAT Group and the Platform for Tax Good 
Governance. These groups are comprised of experts from Member State tax authorities, the 
business sector and NGOs appointed by the European Commission to assist and advise it in the 
underlying areas.219  
 
As discussed in Part IV, the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum has produced extensive guidance on 
transfer pricing issues.220 Some of this guidance even influenced the recommendations 
produced under the BEPS project. For example, on the basis of the work of the Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum, in 2011, the European Commission published a Communication setting out 
guidelines on transfer pricing issues related to low-value-adding intra-group services and non-
EU triangular services.221 The influence of this Communication over the OECD/G20’s 
recommendations on low value-adding intra-group services222 is obvious. The Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum’s work has also been pioneering as far as country-by-country reporting is 
concerned. In 2006, again as a result of the work of the Forum, a Code of Conduct on the 
                                                          
217 Directive 2014/107/EU 
218 For the current status of these updated agreements, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/individuals/personal-taxation/taxation-savings-income/international-
developments_en  
219 The Tax Policy Group and the Recovery Committee are other advisory groups listed on the Commission’s 
website but there is not much information as to the composition and functioning of this group. The Expert Group 
on Taxation of Digital Economy is also still listed, even though it does not appear to have been active since 2014. 
See https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion/further-reading_en  
220 See fn.140. 
221 Communication setting out guidelines on technical issues related to transfer pricing taxation, including low-
value-adding intra-group services and non-EU triangular services (COM(2011)16 final). Also see Council 
conclusions on the communication from the Commission on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in 
the period April 2009 to June 2010 and related proposals: 1. Guidelines on low value adding intra-group services 
and 2. Potential approaches to non-EU triangular cases, (Council of the European Union, 3088th Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 17 May 2011). 
222 Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Action 10: Proposed Modifications to Chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines relating to Low Value-Adding Intra-Group Services, 3 November 2014 – 14 January 2015 (OECD).  
transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the EU was published.223 The Code 
of Conduct provided a template for standardised and partially centralised transfer pricing 
documentation for associated enterprises in the EU. It was addressed to Member States but was 
also intended to encourage MNEs to apply the standardised approach. Member States were 
urged to accept the standardised documentation and consider it as a basic set of information for 
the assessment of an MNE’s transfer prices. The use of standardised documentation was 
optional but it provided an incentive to minimise the administrative costs of complying with 
several national transfer pricing documentation requirements. Country-by-country reporting 
was a major theme of the BEPS project and eventually became one of the minimum standards. 
 
Many recent tax initiatives or legislative proposals either originated or were discussed in the 
context of the Platform for Tax Good Governance. Through several discussion papers, the 
Platform has considered issues such as whether to adopt a General Anti-Abuse Rule in the 
context of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, what criteria should be applied by Member States 
to establish lists of non-cooperative jurisdictions, how to improve dispute resolution, how to 
implement mandatory disclosure for some aggressive tax arrangements, the external strategy 
for effective taxation, the protection of whistle-blowers, the taxation of digital economy and 
much more.224 
 
The EU Code of Conduct Group is another informal body created in 1998,225 to help implement 
the Code of Conduct for business taxation226 in order to tackle harmful tax competition at the 
time. The Code of Conduct Group is an unelected informal body, composed of high-level 
officials of Member States but also reliant on the general secretariat of the Council of the EU. 
It does not take any formal decisions but its recommendations have a lot of political weight. 
The work of the Group is subject to confidentiality and focuses on legislator behaviour rather 
than taxpayer behaviour.227 When the Code of Conduct Group was first created, it was asked 
to assess whether or not tax measures could be considered harmful tax practices. Its work in 
this area has been very successful and the Group continues to monitor potentially harmful tax 
measures.  
 
It is notable that the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation contains provisions which go 
beyond the initial concern of harmful tax competition. For example, paragraphs K and L of the 
Code promote action to curb tax avoidance and evasion. Paragraph M of the Code of Conduct 
also focuses on the geographical extension of the rules on harmful tax competition and the 
policy towards third countries. When the Code of Conduct was first introduced, it was 
                                                          
223 See Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council, of 27 June 2006 on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated 




225 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of 9 March 1998, concerning the establishment of the Code of 
Conduct Group for business taxation, OJ C, pp. 1-2 (1999). 
226 EU Code of Conduct (1997): Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning 
taxation policy DOC 98/C2/01, OJ C 2 (1998). This Code of Conduct has been adopted by the Council the previous 
year, in the context of the EU’s fight against harmful tax competition. See Toward Tax Co-ordination in the 
European Union, A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition, Doc COM(97) 495 final (1 October1997). 
227 Martijn Nouwen, “The Gathering Momentum of International and Supranational Action against Aggressive 
Tax Planning and Harmful Tax Competition: The State of Play of Recent Work of the OECD and European 
Union”, European Taxation, 2013 (Volume 53), No. 10. Also see Vinod Kalloe, “EU Code of Conduct – From 
Reviewing Individual Tax Regimes to Developing Horizontal Policy: Cracking the Code in the BEPS Era”, (2016) 
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considered essential that it should apply on as broad a geographical basis as is possible. On this 
basis, Member States with dependent or associated territories were urged to ensure that the 
principles of the Code also applied to those territories. 
 
These paragraphs have enabled the Code of Conduct Group to expand its work in several areas 
dealing with administrative practices (e.g. cross-border rulings) and anti-abuse (e.g. hybrid 
instruments, hybrid entities and hybrid permanent establishments, hybrid permanent 
establishments and third countries etc).228 Third-country issues have also been developed in 
the context of the dialogue between the EU and third countries, especially Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland, on the application of the principles and the criteria of the Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation.229  
 
Recently, some ground-breaking synergies appear to be resulting from the (unofficial) 
cooperation/coordination between the European Commission, the Commission-appointed 
expert groups and the Code of Conduct Group. The best example of this is the EU list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions, which is proving to be very influential in the development of a 
common fiscal policy (internally and externally). The EU list was spearheaded by the European 
Commission in the context of its work on a common external fiscal strategy, assisted by the 
Platform for Tax Good Governance. The role of the Code of Conduct Group in assessing and 
monitoring countries for the purposes of this list has also been decisive. The overall 
implementation of this project, which is still ongoing, relies heavily on the European 
Commission and the Code of Conduct Group.  
 
The first steps towards developing a uniform approach to non-cooperative (non-EU) tax 
jurisdictions was taken with the European Commission’s Action Plan for a Fair and Efficient 
Corporate Tax System in June 2015.230 In the context of this Action Plan, the European 
Commission published a first pan-EU online map of third-country non-cooperative tax 
jurisdictions. This was a map of non-EU tax jurisdictions which Member States had considered 
uncooperative under their own systems. In other words, the European Commission used 
Member States’ benchmarks for noncompliance and not its own. There were about 30 non-EU 
tax jurisdictions in the first version of the map.231 The map was to be updated periodically and 
used to develop a common EU strategy to deal with such jurisdictions, including via 
coordinated counter measures.232  
 
                                                          
228 See HJI Panayi (2015), fn.21, chapter 5, part 5.6; Kalloe, fn. 227, pp.186-87, and references therein. For the 
more recent guidance on hybrid PEs and third countries, see Guidance on Hybrid Permanent Establishment 
Mismatches concerning a Member State and a third state (doc. 9912/16), Brussels, 13 June 2016, available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9912-2016-INIT/en/pdf . Also see Elizabeth Gil Garcia, 
“Addressing Hybrid PE Mismatches: The Guidance of the Code of Conduct Group”, (2017) 2/3 European 
Taxation 94 
229 For a compilation of the Guidance notes agreed by the Code of Conduct Group (business taxation) since its 
creation in March 1998, see Council of the European Union, Agreed guidance by the Code of Conduct Group 
(business taxation): 1998-2018 (13 July 2018), available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
5814-2018-REV-3/en/pdf.  
230 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘A Fair and Efficient 
Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action’ COM(2015) 302 final, 17 June 2015. 
231 Obviously, the first version has been replaced by later versions. The map is no longer available online as it has 
been superseded by the EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-good-governance/tax-good-governance-world-
seen-eu-countries_en  
232 Ibid, pp 12 and 13 
Indeed, in its Communication on External Strategy,233 the European Commission devised the 
steps to be taken in order to develop a common strategy. As a first step, the European 
Commission would identify the third countries that should be prioritized for screening, 
according to its key indicators. The results of this so-called scoreboard approach were 
published by the European Commission in September 2016.234 As a second step, Member 
States would decide which jurisdictions should be assessed on the basis of criteria agreed 
between them. Again, the European Commission exerted important influence on the criteria 
that were eventually approved by ECOFIN in November 2016235 and used in the subsequent 
screening process by the Code of Conduct Group. The screening process was coordinated with 
the Council’s High Level Working Party on Taxation, and heavily supported and guided by the 
European Commission. The process was completed by September 2017 and Member States 
were called to endorse the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
 
The third step was Member State (i.e. ECOFIN) approval of the final EU list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, which effectively rubber-stamped the European Commission’s work in this area. 
The EU list (also by now colloquially called the EU blacklist) was approved by ECOFIN in 
December 2017. Seventeen countries236 were identified as failing to meet the agreed criteria, 
and forty seven countries were identified as having committed to addressing deficiencies in 
their tax systems and to meet the required criteria.237 The European Commission encouraged 
Member States to agree on co-ordinated sanctions against the listed jurisdictions, such as 
increased monitoring and audits, withholding taxes, special documentation requirements and 
anti-abuse provisions.  
 
Following this ground-breaking development, several more countries were removed or added 
to the EU list. Later on, ECOFIN published a consolidated list, together with a consolidated 
version of the ‘State of play of the cooperation with the EU with respect to commitments taken 
to implement tax good governance principles’.238 Soon thereafter, the European Commission 
published guidelines239 on the use of EU funds in order to ensure that such funds are not 
channelled or transited through entities that are resident in blacklisted tax jurisdictions. This 
was largely expected, given the warnings published in the European Commission’s Q&A 
factsheet accompanying the first version of the EU list,240 in that this list would have a real 
                                                          
233 External Strategy Communication, p.11 
234 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/2016-09-15_scoreboard-
indicators.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-20,842 
235 Economic and Financial Affairs Council, Criteria and process leading to the establishment of the EU list of 
non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes − Council conclusions (8 November 2016), 14166/16, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24230/08-ecofin-non-coop-juris-st14166en16.pdf  
Effectively, ECOFIN adopted the Commission recommendations (see main recommendations and Annex I of the 
Commission Communication on External Strategy) and set out the following criteria to be used to assess countries 
for the purposes of the EU listing process: tax transparency, fair taxation and BEPS implementation (of the 
minimum standards). Also see analysis in HJI Panayi (2018), fn.99, part IV(C). 
236 The 17 jurisdictions on the list were the following: American Samoa, Bahrain, Barbados, Grenada, Guam, 
Korea, Macao, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates. Georgia has also been listed by mistake and removed the following day. 
237 The Commission excluded 48 least developed countries from the pre-assessment and delayed the screening for 
jurisdictions of the Caribbean area (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Turks and Caicos Islands and US Virgin Islands), due to the natural disaster that affected 
the region in September 2017.  
238 See Council document 6236/1/18 of 19 March 2018, available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6236-2018-REV-1/en/pdf  
239 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/c_2018_1756.pdf  
240 This was also released on 5 December 2017. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-
5122_en.htm  
impact.241 Following the European Commission’s guidelines, funding by International 
Financial Institutions such as the European Investment Bank and the various Development 
Financial Institutions can no longer be channelled through listed jurisdictions.242 The 
guidelines also provide information on how implementing partners should assess projects that 
involve entities in listed jurisdictions.243  
 
At the time of writing, the last update to this list was at the March 2019 ECOFIN meeting. 
Following on from the Code of Conduct Group’s recommendations, ten more jurisdictions 
were added to the list for failing to comply with commitments by the agreed deadlines; namely, 
the jurisdictions of Aruba, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Fiji, Marshall Islands, 
Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.244  
 
Overall, the whole process has been criticised for the absence of transparency as regards the 
criteria for including and removing countries from the list, the possible sanctions, and the fact 
that EU Member States were not considered for assessment.245 Although in February 2018, the 
Code of Conduct Group published the letters seeking commitments from the non-cooperative 
jurisdictions,246 this was still not considered to be satisfactory. The lack of transparency during 
the listing/delisting process and the lack of credibility of the resulting blacklist have also been 
discussed at the European Parliament247 but without any changes made to the process. It was 
recently reported that the Austrian Presidency of the EU was considering whether Member 
States should also be subject to the review process by the Code of Conduct Group for the 
purposes of the blacklist,248 though no concrete steps are yet to be taken to that effect.249  
                                                          
241 It had been announced that EU funding in the context of the European Fund for Sustainable Development, the 
European Fund for Strategic Investment and the External Lending Mandate could no longer be channelled through 
any entities in listed countries. Only direct investment in these countries would be allowed. Furthermore, the 
Commission already made reference to the EU list in other legislative proposals such as the public country-by-
country reporting proposal and the proposal for mandatory automatic exchange of information in relation to 
reportable cross-border arrangements. 
242 Standardized wording referring to the adoption of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions has already been 
inserted into various EU legal acts, such as Regulation 2017/1601 establishing the European Fund for Sustainable 
Development and Regulation 2015/1017 establishing the European Fund for Strategic Investments.  
243 Implementing Partners are entities implementing EU funds under indirect management (generally international 
financial institutions and development financial institutions). Implementing Partners have to perform tax 
avoidance checks on all relevant entities involved in a project, as well as align their internal policies with the EU’s 
policy on non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. Although Implementing Partners are invited to review 
their existing portfolio with respect to EU policy, the EU blacklist only applies to new and renewed operations. 
244 See ECOFIN conclusions: The revised EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes − Council 
conclusions (12 March 2019) 7441/19, FISC 169 ECOFIN 297. Available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/38450/st07441-en19-eu-list-oop.pdf  
245 Indicatively, shortly before the release of the EU list, Oxfam published its own research on tax havens, based 
on the Commission’s screening criteria. More specifically, Oxfam applied these criteria to all the countries being 
screened by the Commission, as well as to all the Member States. According to the results of Oxfam’s analysis, a 
robust application of the Commission’s criteria would lead to at least 35 non-EU countries to be included in the 
EU list. Oxfam also found that four Member States (Ireland, Malta, Netherlands and Luxembourg) would likely 
fail the Commission’s criteria. See “Blacklist or whitewash? What a real EU blacklist of tax havens should look 
like”, available at https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/blacklist-or-whitewash-what-real-eu-blacklist-tax-havens-
should-look  
246 See Council document 6671/18 of 6 March 2018, available at: 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6671-2018-INIT/en/pdf  
247 See debate, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20180228+ITEM-025+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN  
248 See report by Reuters, dated 10 October 2018. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-tax-
avoidance/eu-weighs-screening-member-states-over-tax-avoidance-official-idUSL8N1WQ4VB  
249 This was implicitly recommended in the TAXE 3 European Parliament committee report, where it was found 
that some Member States functioned as corporate tax havens. See para 330, Report on financial crimes, tax evasion 
 Putting aside the problematic nature of this blacklist, what is remarkable is how the European 
Commission, assisted by other informal and unelected bodies, is slowly acquiring (some) 
functions of a tax administration in this area - with the tacit approval of Member States. At 
least insofar as the EU list is concerned, not only did the European Commission design and 
subsequently hijack the whole process (with debatable competence to do so),250 but it is also 
involved in the development of common sanctions which could go some way in replicating 









This article reviewed some aspects of the EU’s tax set-up which correspond to aspects of a 
country’s corporate tax regime. The article began by explaining the difficulties and constraints 
in developing a coherent and uniform body of corporate tax legislation, due to the constitutional 
requirement of unanimity in decision-making among Member States. The result is a patchwork 
of hard law and soft law, which has been created mostly on an ad hoc basis and often as a 
reaction to other international developments or EU milestones. What could broadly be 
perceived as EU corporate tax law was scrutinised in the context of the following topics: the 
existence of a uniform tax base and tax rates, the existence of anti-abuse rules and transfer 
pricing rules and, finally, the existence of a common tax administration.  
 
It was shown that, whilst there is currently no uniform tax base nor tax rates, several legislative 
proposals are in the pipelines which seek to change this situation - to some extent. This article 
reviewed the pending CCTB and CCCTB Directives, which aim to provide common rules for 
a corporate tax base and, more innovatively, for cross-border consolidation. Although the 
premises of these draft Directives are older European Commission proposals which were never 
approved, the fact that in the new proposals the issues of the common tax base and cross-border 
consolidation are bifurcated increases the likelihood of at least one of them being unanimously 
approved by Member States. Furthermore, the fact that under the new proposals the focus of 
attention has shifted from the objective of facilitating corporate groupings and simplifying tax 
compliance, to countering tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning also increases this 
likelihood.   
 
This article also reviewed the embattled proposal for the FTT, which provides for a common 
tax levy over certain transactions (i.e. a common tax rate). The strong disagreements with this 
proposal, and the fate of the subsequently modified proposal on the basis of enhanced 
cooperation are indicative of the overall dynamics and challenges faced in this area.  
 
More recent proposals in the context of taxing the digital economy were also considered. These 
proposals have an impact both on the corporate tax base and the tax rate imposed by Member 
States. Namely, the proposal for a digital permanent establishment concept based on significant 
                                                          
and tax avoidance European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2019 on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax 
avoidance (2018/2121(INI)), P8_TA-PROV(2019)0240.  
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/162244/P8_TA-PROV(2019)0240.pdf   
250 For criticism, see HJI Panayi (2018), fn. 99 
digital presence interferes with the discretion of Member States to define the boundaries of 
what they consider as a permanent establishment for the purposes of exercising their taxing 
powers – an important erosion to their tax sovereignty. Furthermore, the digital permanent 
establishment concept goes beyond the definition in the OECD Model Tax Convention251 
which most Member States follow, as such, potentially interfering with the traditional 
allocation of taxing rights that is adopted in tax treaties with third countries. The second 
proposal introduces a digital services tax of 3% on revenues resulting from the provision of 
certain digital services.252 The imposition of what seems to be a direct tax,253 however small, 
on certain types of activities is an undeniable encroachment on the powers of Member States 
to determine the scope of their tax bases and their (corporate) tax rates. Furthermore, the huge 
shift in taxation rights based on the location of the digital user in value creation, if applied 
unilaterally by the EU, might be difficult to enforce and would harm international cooperation. 
Strong concerns have already been voiced by the US government.254 
 
The next part of the article examined one of the most paradoxical developments in this area: 
the adoption of uniform anti-abuse rules under the ATAD, in the absence of a comprehensively 
harmonized corporate tax system. It was shown that these rules, combined with the ad hoc anti-
abuse rules in some of the corporate tax directives and the often contradictory principles 
derived from the case law of the Court of Justice, are jeopardising legal certainty and 
undermining future efforts for a more streamlined EU corporate tax system. The treatment of 
basic transfer pricing concepts such as the arm’s length principle under soft law and hard law 
(i.e. the case law of the Court of Justice on the basis of fundamental freedoms and the state aid 
prohibition) shows the extent to which there is uncoordinated and, arguably, ‘erratic’ EU 
interference in this area.  
 
It was shown in this paper that the area where there was least coordination and harmonization 
was that of tax administration. It would seem that tax administration functions such as cross-
border cooperation and exchange of information amongst Member States are largely 
decentralised and governed by Member State competent authorities. The same model of 
governance even seems to be replicated in the proposed CCTB/CCCTB Directives.255 Only as 
regards the development of an external fiscal policy does there appear to be a gravitational pull 
towards centralising administrative functions in the hands of the European Commission, as 
assisted by the Code of Conduct Group and informal bodies of experts. What is unfortunate is 
that any plans for reform in this area, however ambitious or modest, do not tend to address the 
growing administrative powers and vague obligations of the European Commission and the 
lack of institutional checks and balances.   
 
                                                          
251 See Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
252 Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from 
the provision of certain digital services, COM(2018) 148 final 
253 Interestingly, a recent EU Council opinion recently concluded that the appropriate legal basis for the tax should 
be article 115 and not Art 113 TFEU, on the basis of which the proposal was made. See analysis in 90 Tax Notes 
Int'l 775 (7 May 2018). 
254 See, for example, US Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin’s statement regarding digital tax proposals, 
released on 25 October 2018: “I highlight again our strong concern with countries’ consideration of a unilateral 
and unfair gross sales tax that targets our technology and internet companies.  A tax should be based on income, 
not sales, and should not single out a specific industry for taxation under a different standard.  We urge our 
partners to finish the OECD process with us rather than taking unilateral action in this area.” Available at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm534  
255 See Chapter IX of the 2016 CCCTB Directive 
It is questionable whether this cacophony of conflicting principles which result from the 
peripatetic nature of EU corporate tax law is really suitable for a Union which aspires to have 
one of the most competitive economies in the world. Arguably, this patchwork of rules and 
principles undercuts the Union’s potential for growth and development. Whilst there is case 
law which imposes strict proportional and substance-related thresholds for any national anti-
abuse rules, there is secondary legislation that does not seem to follow those strict thresholds. 
Similarly, whilst there is de minimis secondary legislation which provides relief for double 
taxation of passive investment or facilitates cross-border reorganisations (under very strict 
conditions), there is, at the same time, more general case law which either provides more 
generous treatment (to taxpayers) or draws unintelligible distinctions and makes unpredictable 
exceptions.256 Furthermore, whilst there is growing body of legislation facilitating cross-border 
exchange of information and assistance in the recovery of taxes, there is no central tax 
administration overseeing the effectiveness of the rules and compliance with them. Not only 
that, but there seems to be a momentum for a common external fiscal strategy with some highly 
impactful consequences – namely, sanctions against non-compliant third countries- without 
any real competence to do so. In fact, the institutions and other unofficial actors involved in 
many of these developments are accused of arbitrariness, bias in favour of Member States and 
lack of transparency in their workings and deliberations. All of the above potentially undermine 
the attractiveness of the EU as a good corporate tax destination. 
 
At the time of writing, from a purely legalistic perspective, Brexit does not appear to have an 
immediate impact on the above analysis. In fact, the status quo is likely to be perpetuated vis-
à-vis the UK. Under the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU,257 unlikely to be 
ever ratified by the UK Parliament in its current form as it has been shown,258 during the 
transition period,259 the UK will be treated as if it is still part of the EU, but without any 
involvement in the EU institutions and governance. Therefore, the UK will continue to be 
bound by EU law including whatever has been described in this article as being encompassed 
                                                          
256 This area was not examined in this paper. For more information, see HJI Panayi, in Gore-Browne EU Company 
Law, chapter 19[11]-19[12], fn. 28 
257 See Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 
2018, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/files/draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-
britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community-agreed-negotiators-level-
14-november-2018_en  
For an overview of the issues, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6422_en.htm See also 
Outline of the political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 
November 2018, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/files/outline-political-declaration-setting-
framework-future-relationship-between-european-union-and-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-
ireland-agreed-negotiators-level-14-november-2018_en  
258 At the time of writing, the UK Parliament had overwhelmingly rejected the Withdrawal Agreement three times. 
Some (minimal) preparations for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit were made (see, e.g. the UK’s Temporary tariff 




3747-e911-a968-000d3a29be4a) though an extension period was eventually given by the EU at the UK’s 
request.   
259 The transition period was expected to come into effect after the UK officially exited the EU on 29 March 2019 
and last until the end of 2020. As the Withdrawal Agreement was not ratified by the UK Parliament, Brexit was 
delayed and two further extensions were granted by the EU to the UK to come up with alternative arrangements, 
the latest one expiring on 31 October.  
within the scope of EU corporate tax law. The Court of Justice will also continue to have 
jurisdiction during this period.260  
 
Even after the transition period has ended, under the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will be 
bound to continue to apply the provisions of the DAC261 and of the ATAD262 as applicable at 
the end of the transition period. In other words, any further amendments to these directives 
made in the transition period, during which the UK will have no vote and no right to object, 
will also be binding on it. Similarly, the UK will also be bound by the Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation and all guidance as applicable at that point in time.263 Crucially, the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement commits the UK to good governance in the tax area, which includes, 
“the global standards on transparency and exchange of information, fair taxation, and the 
OECD standards against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)”.264 The preceding Political 
Declaration contains similar provisions.265 The EU and the UK are expected to promote good 
governance in tax matters, improve international cooperation in the tax area and facilitate the 
collection of tax revenues. This is likely to substantially curb the power of the UK to engage 
in aggressive tax competition, should it have chosen to do so in the post-Brexit era. In fact, the 
UK might not even be able to engage in any form of tax competition that focuses on attracting 
investment through the selective conferral of tax incentives to certain industries or 
undertakings. This is because the Withdrawal Agreement includes commitments by the UK to 
be subject to the joint surveillance powers of DG COMP and the UK Competition Authority to 
ensure consistency on state aid matters.266  
 
Whilst these commitments have been criticised as locking-in the UK on an indefinite basis and 
limiting its post-Brexit corporate tax policy options, nevertheless, the EU should not bask in 
the illusion of success. For the EU system of corporate tax law is deeply flawed, in urgent need 
of some cohesion and coordination. As already explained, the current system is a patchwork of 
sometimes contradictory rules and ad hoc solutions, often combined with lack of institutional 
accountability and transparency.  
 
Ironically, Brexit might prove to be a catalyst for more extensive harmonisation in the EU legal 
order, at least as far as corporate tax policy is concerned. To a large extent, it is the lack of 
further harmonisation which has led to the often uncoordinated results and historical 
compromises that we have today. On a political level, the UK has long been considered as one 
of the more recalcitrant Member States,267 though, admittedly, not the only one averse to further 
                                                          
260 Under certain circumstances, the Court of Justice is expected to continue to have jurisdiction after the transition 
period though the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are note very clear on this point.  
261 Annex 4, Article 2(a) 
262 Ibid, Article 2(b) 
263 Ibid, Art 3 
264 Ibid, Article 1 
265 See Art 79 (in Part II, XIV “Level playing field for open and fair competition”) of Political declaration setting 
out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom (22 November 
2012), available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf   
266 It had already been announced at an earlier stage of the negotiation process that the UK would maintain a 
rigorous state aid control system, even in the no-deal scenario, and that the UK Competition authority would take 
on the role of enforcement and supervision for the whole of the UK. See the Guidance published by the UK 
Government on 23 August 2018 to guide citizens and business in the event of a no-deal Brexit, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-aid-if-theres-no-brexit-deal. For the state aid guidance, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-aid-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/state-aid-if-theres-no-brexit-deal. 
 
267 See Klaas Staal’s LSE blog which shows how Britain has most often taken positions against the majority in 
the Council of the European Union, available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/10/britain-has-most-often-
tax harmonisation. The UK’s stance against the European Commission’s proposals for the FTT 
and, less emphatically, the CCCTB is indicative of this recalcitrance. Whatever the final 
withdrawal deal – if any- the vacuum to be left by the departure of the UK from the EU is 
unlikely to be filled by any other Member State with the same predisposition towards (or better, 
against) further (tax) integration and the economic prowess to back it up – at least not in the 
immediate future. In any case, even before Brexit, the dynamics in the international tax system 
had already - some would say irrevocably - changed and the polemic against base erosion and 
profit shifting simply facilitated further tax integration in the EU. In other words, the process 
for further corporate tax harmonization may have already started, with or without the UK’s 
input and involvement. It is hoped that this process will help resolve the problematic issues 




                                                          
taken-positions-against-the-majority-in-the-council-of-the-european-union/ This is based on a paper authored 
jointly with Marco Fantini, where a Member State’s influence on decision‐making in the Council was assessed 
on the basis of the voting behaviour of other countries. UK had less support than all other Member States. See 
Marco Fantini & Klaas Staal, “Influence in the EU: Measuring Mutual Support”, 56 (2018) 2 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 212-229, at p.216. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.12586  
 
